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Compensation for Environmental Damage 
in China: Theory and Practice 
MICHAEL G. FAURE

 & LIU JING
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many observers have pointed to the fact that the spectacular 
economic growth in China has come at a high price, especially 
concerning the environmental costs related to this growth.1  
There is increasing literature, both inside and outside of China, 
 
 Michael Faure is a professor of comparative and international 
environmental law at Maastricht University, and professor of comparative 
private law and economics at Erasmus University Rotterdam, both in the 
Netherlands.  At the time of writing this article he was haiwaimingshi at the 
Research Center for Law of Economics of the China University of Political 
Science and Law (CUPL).  He is grateful to the China Ministry of Education and 
to the Research Center for Law and Economics of CUPL for their support. 
Email: michael.faure@maastrichtuniversity.nl. 
 Liu Jing is a postdotoral researcher at Wuhan University, China and a 
guest researcher at Maastricht University, the Netherlands.  Email: 
jing.liu@maastrichtuniversity.nl. 
 1. Chinese authorities estimated the costs of environmental degradation to 
be 12745.7 billion Renminbi (RMB) in 2008, which would represent 3.9% of the 
gross domestic product (GDP); the imputed costs of soil cleanup would reach 
540.31 billion RMB.  See [China Has Until 2008 to Complete the Environmental 
and Economic Accounting Research Report], CHINESE ACADEMY FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING (Dec. 25, 2010), http://www.caep.org.cn/ 
ReadNews.asp?NewsID=2761 (China).  Earlier reports from the World Bank on 
the amount of pollution costs in China in terms of GDP were also quite 
alarming.  They indicated that environmental damage costs were 8% of the total 
GDP in China.  See THE WORLD BANK, CHINA 2020 CLEAR WATER, BLUE SKIES: 
CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT IN THE NEW CENTURY 23 (1997), available at 
siteresources.worldbank.org/inteapregtopenvironment/Resources/Clear_Water_
Blue_Skies.pdf. 
1
FAURE  LIU - FINAL-NUMBERED 3/26/2014 11:16 AM 
2014] ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE COMPENSATION 227 
 
on tools available to China to fight against pollution.2  Indeed, 
with growing economic welfare, the demand for environmental 
quality is increasing in China as well.3 
The aim of our study is not so much to look at instruments 
aiming at the prevention of environmental harm, but to address 
the extent victims of environmental harm can be compensated in 
China.  The concept of “victims” should be interpreted broadly to 
include both human victims and damage to the environment.  
When the environment itself is the victim, questions arise 
regarding the right of the government or a non-governmental 
organization (NGO) to ask for remedies on behalf of the 
environment.  The goal of our study is not only to provide an 
insight into the “law on the books” by describing which 
instruments and remedies are available, but also to address “law 
in action,” by examining the extent to which various 
compensation mechanisms are indeed applied in practice.  We 
have undertaken interviews with stakeholders in China to obtain 
information on the way in which environmental damage is 
remedied. 
Our focus is on remedies for environmental harm.  Even 
though the traditional remedy for damages resulting from 
environmental pollution is monetary compensation, other 
remedies, such as restitution, may be relevant as well.  We will 
address both available remedies on the basis of the regulatory 
framework, and examine the extent to which these remedies are 
applied.  In addition, we will formulate suggestions for reform 
where appropriate. 
The issue of appropriate compensation for environmental 
damage has become a hot topic in China.4  One can often hear 
 
 2. See generally NEIL CARTER & ARTHUR P.J. MOL, ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE IN CHINA (2007); CHEN GANG, POLITICS OF CHINA’S ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION: PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS (2009); XIAOYING MA & LEONARD 
ORTOLANO, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, ENFORCEMENT, 
AND COMPLIANCE (2000); Arthur P.J. Mol & Neil T. Carter, China’s 
Environmental Governance in Transition, 15 ENVTL. POL. 149 (2006); Lan Xue et 
al., Environmental Governance for China: Major Recommendations of a Task 
Force, 16 ENVTL. POL. 669 (2007). 
 3. See generally GUO X. & D. MARINOVA, ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS IN 
CHINA: FACILITATING THE GREENING OF THE ECONOMY (2011), available at 
http://www.mssanz.org.au/modsim2011/D12/guo.pdf. 
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about cases of environmental harm confronting the Chinese 
people and their environment, whereby the question of 
appropriate compensation often arises.5  This issue is typical, 
given recent legislative changes in China.  In December 2009, 
China adopted a new Tort Liability Law (TLL).6  This law 
integrated some important principles concerning environmental 
liability.7  In addition, sector-based laws and regulations—in 
some cases equally aimed at environmental liability—have 
recently been published or are under consideration for adoption.8  
Even though environmental insurance markets are not yet that 
well developed in China, environmental insurance products are 
becoming increasingly available on the Chinese market.9  Some of 
these insurance products are strongly promoted by the 
government and aim at compensating environmental harm.10  
Strikingly, the only domain in which compensation seems to work 
better—not only on paper, but also in practice—is cases involving 
marine oil pollution in which international conventions have 
played an important role.11  We will use the economic analysis of 
the law to look at the effectiveness of the compensation for 
environmental damage in China. Moreover, we will compare 
compensation instruments issued either in the United States or 
in Europe with the situation in China in order to provide a 
comparative perspective. 
 
 4. Adam Moser & Tseming Yang, Environmental Tort Litigation in China, 
41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10895, 10895-96 (2011). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See [Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 
2010) [hereinafter TLL], available at http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/ 
201001/t20100110_300173.html (China). 
 7. These principles include: strict liability, reversed burden of proof, 
proportional liability, and the determination of liability when third party 
activities are involved.  See Mo Zhang, Tort Liabilities and Torts Law: The New 
Frontier of Chinese Legal Horizon, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 415, 486-89 
(2011), available at http://rjglb.richmond.edu/index.php/tort-liabilities-and-torts-
law-the-new-frontier-of-chinese-legal-horizon/. 
 8. See infra part II.A.a. 
 9. See infra part III.B.b. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See infra part IV. 
3
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This article is organized as follows: following the introduction 
in Part I, Part II focuses on the role of liability rules in 
compensation for environmental harm, then Part III focuses on 
insurance, and Part IV discusses the specific case of marine oil 
pollution.  For each topic, we will first describe theoretical 
possibilities for providing compensation, and then examine the 
role these mechanisms play in practice.  Part V offers a few 
concluding remarks, and provides an economic analysis and 
policy recommendations. 
II. LIABILITY RULES 
A.  Theory: Environmental Liability in the Past and the 
Present 
a. Introduction 
Since quite a few publications have already explored the 
issue of environmental liability in China,12 we will be relatively 
brief in discussing theoretical possibilities for victims of 
environmental pollution to obtain compensation for the 
environmental damage they suffered.  The most important 
question is how these theoretical possibilities are implemented in 
practice.13  In this part, we discuss two types of environmental 
damage that can be caused by accidents or gradual accumulation: 
(1) traditional damage (such as personal injury and property 
damage); and (2) ecological damage (environmental damage per 
se).  Such a distinction is relevant because, for the latter, 
 
 12. Some literature discusses environmental liability under the background 
of the newly published Tort Liability Law.  See generally Michael Faure & Hu 
Weiqiang, Towards a Reform of Environmental Liability in China: An Economic 
Analysis, 13 ASIA PAC. J. ENVTL. L. 225 (2011); Zhang, supra note 7, at 486.  
While other literature discusses the topic from the perspective of environmental 
litigation and environmental dispute resolution.  See Moser & Yang, supra note 
4, at 10896.  See generally Yuhong Zhao, Environmental Dispute Resolution in 
China, 16 J. ENVTL. L. 157 (2004); RACHEL E. STERN, Navigating the Boundaries 
of Political Tolerance: Environmental Litigation in China (Fall 2009) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley), available at 
http://www.icassecretariat.org/files/R%20Stern_Navigating%20the% 
20Boundaries_Ph.D.%20Diss%20(2009)_Double%20Spaced.pdf. 
 13. See infra part II.B. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/3
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restoration is usually more important than just monetary 
compensation.  The necessity of government involvement makes 
China’s compensation regime a combined civil and administrative 
system.  These characteristics make traditional tort law 
insufficient to compensate for ecological damage.14 
Traditionally there were possibilities to address 
environmental damage via private law, but the rules were not 
always clear or consistent.15  Rules concerning environmental 
liability were contained in the so-called General Principles of 
Civil Law of 1986 (GPCL),16 as well as in environmental statutes 
covering specific fields.  The Environmental Protection Law (EPL) 
of 198917 is the basic statute in the field of environmental law in 
China.  In addition to this basic statute, some other sector-based 
environmental statutes also have some environmental liability 
provisions.  These special environmental statutes include, for 
example, the Marine Environmental Protection Law (MEPL) of 
1982, 1999,18 the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law 
(WPPL) of 1984, 2008,19 and the Solid Wastes Pollution 
Prevention and Control Law (SWPPL) of 1995.20  The difficulty 
 
 14. Michael G. Faure & Liu Jing, New Models for the Compensation of 
Natural Resources Damage, 4 KY. J. EQUINE AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCE L. 261, 
269-73 (2012) (discussing the unique characteristics of ecological damage). 
 15. See William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, Limits of the Law in Addressing 
China’s Environmental Dilemma, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 125, 127 (1997). 
 16. [General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) 
[hereinafter GPCL], available at http://www.china.org.cn/china/ 
LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/11/content_21898337.htm (China). 
 17. [Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, 
effective Dec. 26, 1989) [hereinafter EPL], available at http://www.china.org.cn/ 
english/environment/34356.htm (China). 
 18. [Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, 
revised Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000) [hereinafter MEPL], available at 
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/laws/200710/t20071012_656329.htm (China). 
 19. [Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 11, 
1984, revised Feb. 28, 2008, effective June 1, 2008) [hereinafter WPPL], 
available at faole .fao.org docs te ts chn23  9.doc (China). 
 20. [Solid Wastes Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
5
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lay in the fact that the conditions for liability differed between 
the GPCL and the specialized statutes.21 
Article 124 of the GPCL stipulates that: “Any person who 
pollutes the environment and causes damages to others in 
violation of State provisions for environmental protection and the 
prevention of pollution shall bear civil liability in accordance with 
the law.”22  A violation of a relevant regulation is a condition for 
liability.23  The specialized laws, however, do not require a 
violation of a specific regulation for liability.24  For example, the 
EPL states in Section 1 of Article 41 that: “A unit that has caused 
an environmental pollution hazard shall have the obligation to 
eliminate it and make compensation to the unit or individual that 
suffered direct losses.”25  Hence, the latter seems to introduce the 
possibility of liability without violating any regulation, 
introducing a strict liability rule.26 
In Chinese legal scholarship, as well as in case law, 
differences of opinion exist as to: (1) whether the GPCL or the 
specialized statutes have priority, and (2) how to interpret the 
requirement that a relevant law must be violated.27  These 
debates have to an important extent been eliminated since China 
introduced the TLL,28 which was passed on December 26, 2009.  
Chapter VIII of the TLL contains rules on environmental liability 
and opts for a strict liability regime, which would eliminate the 
legal debate that took place in the past.29  Although the change 
brought about by the TLL seems quite important from an 
outsider’s perspective, experts assert that the introduction of 
environmental liability in the TLL is less important than one may 
 
Oct. 30, 1995, revised Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005) [hereinafter 
SWPPL], available at faole .fao.org docs te ts chn 331 .doc (China). 
 21. As discussed infra, the GPCL requires the violation of a legal obligation 
to establish liability.  While in these acts, the liability rules are similar to that 
under the EPL, the violation is not a necessary requirement. 
 22. GPCL, art. 124. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See MEPL, art. 90; WPPL, art. 85; SWPPL, art. 84. 
 25. EPL, art. 41. 
 26. See Faure & Hu, supra note 12, at 231-32. 
 27. Id. at 231-33. 
 28. TLL, art. 70. 
 29. See Faure & Hu, supra note 12, at 235-36. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/3
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think.30  Commentators have explained that the new provisions 
are merely a summary of existing rules and in fact contain no 
significant changes.31  Laws like the EPL already contained a 
strict liability rule, so the new rule in the TLL is less than 
revolutionary.32  Moreover, the change in material rules with 
respect to environmental liability may not be that important 
since the practical limits in obtaining compensation via liability 
rules may be far more serious than the impediments in 
legislation.33  As far as ecological damage is concerned, there are 
still questions concerning the applicable liability rule.34  For 
example, it is unclear whether the environmental liability rules 
in the civil law mentioned above also cover ecological damage. 
The TLL may broaden the scope of liability for environmental 
harms.35  In the second official discussion draft on December 21, 
2008, Article 67 stipulated: “If environmental pollution causes 
harm to another, the polluter shall bear tort liability, but if other 
laws specify defenses, then the other laws shall govern.”36 
 
 30. Interview with Wang Canfa, Professor, China University of Political 
Science and Law, Centre for Legal Aid to Pollution Victims (CLAPV), in Beijing, 
China (Aug. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa] (on file 
with authors). 
 31. Id.  See Moser & Yang, supra note 4, at 10897-98 (discussing the linkage 
between the TLL and existing legislation); see also Zhang, supra note 7, at 486-
89. 
 32. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30. 
 33. See Surya Deva, The PRC Tort Law: A Big Step Forward?, 2 CITY U. H.K. 
L. REV. 383, 394-95 (2010) (showing the impact of enforcement on the practical 
effects of the new TLL). 
 34. As discussed infra, ecological damage is not discussed in other 
environmental statutes, with the exception of the MEPL. 
 35. The general tort liability provision under the GPCL stipulates: “Citizens 
and legal persons who through their fault encroach upon the State or collective 
property or the property or the property or person of other people shall bear civil 
liability.  Civil liability shall still be borne even in the absence of fault, if the law 
so stipulates.”  GPCL, art. 106.  Under the GPCL, only when an act involves 
damage to property or persons can liability be established.  The TLL, as 
discussed infra defines “civil rights and interests” broadly, by using a catchall 
provision. 
 36. See generally [Tort Liability Law of People’s Republic of China (2d 
Official Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 2008)], (George W. Conk & Wang Zhu, trans., 
Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1501302 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =1501302. 
7
FAURE  LIU - FINAL-NUMBERED 3/26/2014 11:16 AM 
2014] ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE COMPENSATION 233 
 
Under this provision, liability is limited to harm to people, 
but impairment to the environment was not included.37  The final 
text adopted a broader definition by referring to “any harm,” and 
the prerequisite of “damage to another” is no longer mentioned.38   
This change may be read as expanding the scope of liability to 
both harm to people and harm to the environment.  However, this 
provision needs to be explained in line with the rest of the 
statute, including the general provision about the statute’s goals 
(Article 1) and overall scope (Article 2).  Article 1 states that the 
aim of this law is “to protect the legitimate rights and interests of 
parties in civil law relationships.”39  Article 2 further clarifies 
that this law applies to the infringement upon “civil rights and 
interests.”40  It holds: 
Those who infringe upon civil rights and interests shall be 
subject to the tort liability according to this Law.  The term “civil 
rights and interests” used in this act includes the right to life, the 
right to health, the right to name, the right to reputation, the 
right to honor, right to self image, right of privacy, marital 
autonomy, guardianship, ownership, usufruct, security interest, 
copyright, patent right, exclusive right to use a trademark, right 
of discovery, equities, right of succession, and other personal and 
property rights and interests.41 
The term “civil rights and interests” is determined by listing 
specific rights and interests.42  The catchall expression also 
enables an interest to receive protection under the TLL, even if it 
is not established as a “civil right” and not explicitly included in 
the list.43  However, these provisions provide no clear guidance on 
 
 37. See generally id. 
 38. TLL, art. 6  (“Where any harm is caused by environmental pollution, the 
polluter shall assume the tort liability.”). 
 39. TLL, art. 1 (“In order to protect the legitimate rights and interests of 
parties in civil law relationships, clarify the tort liability, prevent and punish 
tortious conduct, and promote the social harmony and stability, this Law is 
formulated.”). 
 40. TLL, art. 2. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Great Spill in the Gulf . . . and a Sea of 
Pure Economic Loss: Reflections on the Boundaries of Civil Liability, 116 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 105, 114-15 (2011). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/3
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whether liability can be established if there are no personal losses 
involved.  In other words, it is not clear whether liability can be 
established for pure ecological damage or damage to natural 
resources.  Hence, to determine the extent that ecological damage 
needs to be restored and compensated, one still needs to look at 
specific environmental statutes.  The only law that explicitly 
mentions ecological damage as a compensable tort is within the 
MEPL, concerning the release of oil into the marine 
environment.44 
b. Basis of Liability 
Until the promulgation of the TLL in December 2009, the 
basis of environmental liability could generally be found in 
Article 124 of the GPCL and in environmental protection statutes 
covering specialized fields.45  These have not been formally 
abrogated, but it is likely that in practice they may play a minor 
role in the future, since victims will likely rely on the TLL.46  
Chapter VIII of the TLL deals explicitly with environmental 
liability.47  Article 65 of the TLL unconditionally provides that 
the polluter shall be held liable for the harm caused by his 
pollution.48  The language in Article 65 strongly suggests that a 
strict liability rule applies.49  In contrast to Article 124 of the 
GPCL, Article 65 of the TLL does not mention any requirement of 
violation of relevant laws.  In that respect, Article 65 of the TLL 
 
 44. See infra part IV.A.a. 
 45. See supra part II.A.a. 
 46. According to Article 83 of the Legislation Law: “With regard to laws, 
administrative regulations, local regulations, autonomous regulations, separate 
regulations or rules, if they are formulated by one and the same organ and if 
there is inconsistency between special provisions and general provisions, the 
special provisions shall prevail; if [an] inconsistency between the new provisions 
and the old provisions, the new provisions shall prevail.”  [Legislation Law of 
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000) [hereinafter Legislation 
Law], available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207419.htm 
(China). 
 47. TLL, art. 65-68. 
 48. Id. art. 6  (“Where any harm is caused by environmental pollution, the 
polluter shall assume the tort liability.”). 
 49. Zhang, supra note 7, at 486-87. 
9
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resembles the approach followed in the EPL of 1989.50  
Consequently, a violation of relevant laws is no longer a condition 
for liability, and neither is compliance with a regulation 
mentioned as a specific defense.51  Exemptions to tort liability are 
enumerated in a seemingly limited way in Chapter III of the 
TLL.52  For example, under the TLL, when the injured party 
shares responsibility for his injuries, the liability of the tortfeasor 
may be mitigated, but if the injured party intentionally injures 
himself, the tortfeasor will not be held liable.53  Liability is also 
exonerated when the harm is caused by force majeure.54 
The TLL provides the new legal basis for environmental 
liability in China.  What remains to be clarified is how the TLL 
relates to existing specific environmental statutes.55  As 
discussed supra, there are liability provisions in some 
environmental statutes dealing with specific environmental 
components, such as the MEPL, the WPPL, and the Atmospheric 
Pollution Prevention and Control Law (APPL).56 
However, China does not have specific rules on liability for 
soil pollution.57  Applying the general environmental liability 
rules to soil pollution creates some practical difficulties.  Given 
the long-term characteristics of soil pollution, polluters are 
difficult to identify and may cease to exist before the 
manifestations of the pollution become apparent.  The cleanup 
 
 50. Faure & Hu, supra note 12, at 235. 
 51. Id. at 235-37. 
 52. Id. at 237. 
 53. TLL, art. 27 (“The actor shall not be liable for any harm that is caused 
intentionally by the victim.”). 
 54. TLL, art. 26 (“Where the victim of a tort is also at fault as to the 
occurrence of harm, the liability of the tortfeasor may be mitigated.”); see also 
id., art. 27; id., art. 29 (“Where any harm to another person is caused by a force 
majeure, the tortfeasor shall not be liable, except as otherwise provided for by 
law.”). 
 55. Faure & Hu, supra note 12, at 237. 
 56. [Atmospheric Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Sept. 5, 1987, effective June 1, 1988, revised Apr. 29, 2000, effective Sept. 1, 
2000) [hereinafter APPL], available at http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-09/07/ 
content_29877.htm (China). 
 57. See ZHAO XIAOBO, DEVELOPING AN APPROPRIATE CONTAMINATED LAND 
REGIME IN CHINA: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE US AND THE UK 65-67 (2013) 
(discussing the liability regime for soil pollution). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/3
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and compensation for soil pollution are now subject to a variety of 
different, rather piecemeal types of stipulations.58  For example, 
the SWPPL provides in Article 35 that the entities discharging 
industrial solid wastes need to take preventative measures at 
sites before terminating their activities.59  In response, the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) (formerly, the 
Environmental Protection Agency) has issued guidance 
documents on the prevention of and liability for soil pollution.60  
The guidance documents which describe strengthening pollution 
prevention requirements during the relocation of industrial sites, 
and the opinion on strengthening soil pollution prevention 
requirements each provide guidance on the allocation of the soil 
pollution liability.61  The Huanban 2004 Document stipulates 
that producers of dangerous waste must assess the risk before 
relocation to a new industrial site, and places the burden of 
cleaning up contamination on the polluters.62  Likewise, the 
Huanfa 2008 Document is based on the polluter-pays principle, 
and holds the former operators as the primarily liable parties.63  
When polluters have already ceased to exist, or cannot be 
identified, the government or the transferee of the land shall take 
remediation measures.64  However, these documents are still too 
 
 58. See id. 
 59. SWPPL, art. 3  (“Where it is necessary for the entities discharging 
industrial solid wastes to be terminated, measures for preventing and 
controlling pollution shall be taken in advance to the facilities and sites for 
storing and treating industrial solid wastes, and the untreated industrial solid 
wastes shall be disposed properly to prevent environmental pollution.”). 
 60. See ZHAO, supra note 57, at 65-67. 
 61. MINISTRY OF ENVTL. PROT., [NOTICE OF GREAT JOB ON CORPORATE 
RELOCATION PROCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL] 
(June 1, 2004) [hereinafter HUANBAN 2004 DOCUMENT], available at  
http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/zj/bgt/200910/ t20091022_173879.htm (China); 
MINISTRY OF ENVTL. PROT., [OPINIONS ON STRENGTHENING SOIL POLLUTION 
PREVENTION AND CONTROL WORK] (June 6, 2008) [hereinafter HUANFA 2008 
DOCUMENT], available at http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bwj/200910/ 
t20091022_174598.htm (China). 
 62. HUANBAN 2004 DOCUMENT, art. 1. 
 63. HUANFA 2008 DOCUMENT, pt. 8. 
 64. Id. 
11
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abstract to solve many problems in practice.65  There are also 
several drafts intended to provide more detailed technical 
guidance on the assessment, monitoring, and management of 
polluted sites,66 but these drafts have not entered into force yet.  
In addition to those guidance documents, some local authorities 
have made efforts to issue their own requirements for prevention 
and remediation of soil pollution, such as Shengyang, and 
Chongqing.67  These municipal requirements have many 
similarities to the national guidance documents.68 
 
 65. For example, it does not answer the questions of who should be liable if 
damage still emerges after the restoration, and how to allocate the liability 
between existing and former operators. 
 66. See generally [CHINA’S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STANDARDS: 
GUIDELINES FOR RISK ASSESSMENT OF CONTAMINATED SITES (DRAFT)] (issued by 
the Ministry of Envtl. Prot.), available at http://www.sepa.gov.cn/info/bgw/ 
bbgth/200910/W020091009550671751947.pdf (China); [CHINA’S NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STANDARDS: GUIDELINES FOR SOIL REMEDIATION OF 
CONTAMINATED SITES (DRAFT)] (issued by the Ministry of Envtl. Prot.), available 
at http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgth/200912/W020091223374051865851.pdf 
(China); [CHINA’S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STANDARDS: TECHNICAL 
GUIDELINES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING OF SITES (DRAFT)] (issued by the 
Ministry of Envtl. Prot.), available at http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgth/ 
201002/W020100208572809009978.pdf (China); [CHINA’S NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STANDARDS: THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL SITE INVESTIGATION (DRAFT)] (issued by the Ministry of Envtl. 
Prot.), available at  http://www.sepa.gov.cn/info/bgw/bbgth/200908/t20090812_ 
157381.htm (China), click link [THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL SITE INVESTIGATION (DRAFT)]; [TEMPORARY SOIL MANAGEMENT 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL  MONITORING OF CONTAMINATED SITES (DRAFT)] (issued by 
the Ministry of Envtl. Prot.), available at http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/ 
bgth/200912/W020091223431801518384.pdf (China). 
 67. For example, in Shenyang, a regulation on contaminated sites 
remediation and restoration was promulgated in 2008.  See [Shenyang 
Hazardous Waste Pollution Prevention Regulations] (promulgated by the 
Shenyang City People’s Cong., Oct. 30, 2008, effective Jan. 1, 2009) [hereinafter 
SHENYANG REGULATION ON PREVENTING POLLUTION FROM DANGEROUS WASTE], 
available at http://www.ln.gov.cn/zfxx/fggz/gwyfg_3/sy/200902/t20090204_ 
330763.html (China).  The Chongqing government also issued a document on 
soil pollution restoration.  CHONGQING ENVTL. PROT. BUREAU, [NOTICE ON 
PROMOTING THE RESTORATION AT CONTAMINATED INDUSTRIAL SITES IN CHONGQING] 
(May 27, 2013) [hereinafter CHONGQING RESTORATION OF CONTAMINATED SITES 
REGULATIONS], available at http://www.cq.gov.cn/publicinfo/web/views/Show! 
detail.action?sid=1106243 (China). 
 68. See generally SHENYANG REGULATION ON PREVENTING POLLUTION FROM 
DANGEROUS WASTE, supra note 67; CHONGQING RESTORATION OF CONTAMINATED 
SITES REGULATIONS, supra note 67. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/3
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c. Causation, Multiple Tortfeasors, and Burden of 
Proof 
With respect to issues that can have a crucial bearing on the 
effectiveness of environmental liability as a compensation 
mechanism, the TLL of 2009 also produced interesting 
innovations.  Article 66 of the TLL provides that: 
Where any dispute arises over an environmental pollution, the 
polluter shall assume the burden to prove that it should not be 
liable or its liability could be mitigated under certain 
circumstances as provided for by law or to prove that there is no 
causation between its conduct and the harm.69 
Article 66 completely shifts liability to the polluter.  As a 
consequence of the strict liability introduced in Article 65, it is 
the polluter who now bears the burden of proving defenses, 
including exemption or mitigation of liability.70  The polluter also 
has the burden to prove there is a lack of causation between its 
activities and the personal or environmental harm.  This could 
present a potentially dangerous situation for defendants to the 
extent that they may not be able to show that their activity was 
not the source of a particular damage suffered by the plaintiffs.71  
However, this is not revolutionary either, since a rule of the 
reversal of the burden of proof already exists under the CPL of 
1992.72  Moreover, the concern of over-deterrence can be balanced 
through the implementation of this reversal of burden provision 
in practice, which is often criticized as problematic.73 
 
 69. TLL, art. 66. 
 70. Zhang, supra note 7, at 487-88. 
 71. Economic analysis shows that this rule may lead to over-deterrence of the 
potential polluters.  See Faure & Hu, supra note 12, at 241.  Literature also 
shows concern that the TLL allows the reversal of the burden of proof without 
requiring even an indication of a casual relationship.  See Helmut Koziol & Yan 
Zhu, Background and Key Contents of the New Chinese Tort Liability Law, 1 J. 
EUR. TORT L. 328, 357-58 (2010). 
 72. SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., [THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT ON THE 
APPLICATION OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW] (1992), available at http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=54915 (China). 
 73. See Moser & Yang, supra note 4, at 10897.  For more detailed information 
about the practice, see infra part II.B.c. 
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As far as the multiple polluter case is concerned, the TLL 
holds in Article 67 that: 
Where the environmental pollution is caused by two or more 
polluters, the seriousness of liability of each polluter shall be 
determined according to the type of pollutant, volume of emission 
and other factors.74 
In the case of multiple polluters, damages will be apportioned 
based on the type of pollutants and the volume of emissions.75  It 
is striking that Chinese law follows a proportional approach in 
the case of multiple tortfeasors, but chooses instead to adopt 
shifting of the burden of proof (in Article 66) in the case of 
uncertain causation.76 
The new rules dealing with multiple tortfeasors were also 
mentioned as an innovation by Chinese experts we interviewed.77  
Before the promulgation of the TLL, in most cases, a joint and 
several liability rule applied.  The GPCL stipulates that: “If two 
or more persons jointly infringe upon another person’s rights and 
cause him damage, they shall bear joint liability.”78  The GPCL 
and the EPL have no specific provisions on multiple tortfeasors in 
the case of environmental liability; thus the general rule under 
the GPCL applies.79  However, with the introduction of the TLL, 
liability needs to be decided according to the contributions of each 
polluter, and a several liability rule applies. 
 
 74. TLL, art. 67. 
 75. Zhang, supra note 7, at 488-89. 
 76. Faure & Hu, supra note 12, at 241. 
 77. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30. 
 78. GPCL, art. 130. 
 79. According to Article 83 of the Legislation Law, if the same organ 
promulgates the rules and there is inconsistency, the specialized rule has 
priority over the general rules.  In the GPCL and the EPL, the environmental 
liability rules are specialized rules and the general tort law is a general rule.  If 
there is a specific provision on multiple tortfeasors in an environmental liability 
case, the specific provision shall have the priority.  However, this rule does not 
exist in the GPCL and the EPL.  Hence the general rule in the GPCL applies.   
Legislation Law, art. 83. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/3
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d. Remedies and Standards 
Article 15 of the TLL80 provides for “forms of tort liability” 
which in fact enumerate the remedies that could be applied.  It is 
a long list including: 
(1) cessation of infringement; 
(2) removal of obstruction; 
(3) elimination of danger; 
(4) return of property; 
(5) restoration to the original status; 
(6) compensation for losses; 
(7) apology; and 
(8) elimination of consequences and restoration of reputation.81 
Article 15 in fine holds that these forms of tort liability can apply 
separately or simultaneously.82 
As far as environmental harm is concerned, injunctions, 
elimination of risk, and restitution may be important as well as, 
of course, compensation for losses.83  These remedies, however, 
are more suitable for traditional damage.84  As far as 
compensation for ecological damage is concerned, difficulties exist 
to determine which part of the damage is compensable.85  As 
discussed earlier, the environmental liability rules in the TLL do 
not explicitly recognize ecological damage as compensable.86  
 
 80. TLL, art. 67. 
 81. TLL, art. 15. 
 82. Id.  (“The above methods of assuming the tort liability may be adopted 
individually or jointly”). 
 83. See Zhao, supra note 12, at 187-89. 
 84. See supra part II.A.a. 
 85. How to compensate for natural resource damage has long been hotly 
discussed in the United States.  See generally Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource 
Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269 (1989) [hereinafter Cross 1989]; Frank 
B. Cross, Restoring Restoration for Natural Resource Damages, 24 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 319 (1993) [hereinafter Cross 1993]; Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, 
Measuring Loss of Use Damages in Natural Resource Damage Actions, 30 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 417 (2005).  For a discussion on the difficulties in 
quantifying ecological damage in the European Union, see generally G.M. van 
den Broek, Environmental Liability and Nature Protection Areas: Will the EU 
Environmental Liability Directive Actually Lead to the Restoration of Damaged 
Natural Resources?, 5 UTRECHT L. REV. 117 (2009). 
 86. See supra part II.A.a. 
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Therefore, claims are usually limited to require compensation for 
direct losses suffered.87  Claims for pure ecological damage are 
allowed only when specific legislation has explicit provisions, and 
such provisions are usually limited to preventive measures or 
restoration measures.88  Even when restoration measures are 
concerned, assessment standards lack a determination for 
restoring the damage.89  This is especially true for soil pollution; 
so far, technical standards have not been defined or are too old to 
solve existing problems.90  This means that, for example, quality 
standards indicating what the desired quality of the soil is to 
which the soil should be restored, do not exist or are not 
satisfactory.91  This makes the task of the judge difficult if it 
cannot be clearly indicated which restoration standard would be 
required.  In order to face those difficulties, the government 
intends to promulgate assessment standards.  A first step in that 
direction has been taken in the Recommendation on Methods on 
Assessing Environmental Damage, published by the MEP in 
2011.92  This document gives some general guidance on how to 
assess pure ecological damage in some specific areas, but it is not 
a binding standard that can be applied in court.93  Hence, it 
 
 87. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30. 
 88. Marine oil pollution is such an example.  See infra part IV.A.a. 
 89. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30; Interview with Wang 
Jin, Professor, Peking University Law School, in Beijing, China (Aug. 24, 2011) 
[hereinafter Interview with Prof. Wang Jin] (on file with authors). 
 90. Wang Shuyi, [A Few Thoughts on the Drafting of the Soil Pollution 
Prevention Act of the People’s Republic of China], 149 L. REV. 73, 74 (2008) 
(China). 
 91. For example, the Environmental Quality Standards for Soil issued in 
1995 applied to cultivated lands, pasture, forestry and natural reserve areas.  
However, on the one hand the application scope of these standards is very 
limited; while on the other hand experts held that many parts of the standards 
do not fit the Chinese soil status.  See id. 
 92. The Recommendation on Methods on Assessing Environmental Damage 
is developed by the Chinese Academy for Environment Planning, designated by 
the Ministry of Environmental Protection.  It is not legally binding. 
[RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMPENSATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, 1ST 
EDITION], (issued by the Chinese Academy for Env’t Planning, Ministry of Envtl. 
Prot.) [hereinafter METHODS ON ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE], available 
at http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bwj/201105/W020110530352486511962.pdf 
(China). 
 93. This Recommendation is made by a scientific research center—The 
Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning—under the designation of the 
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certainly does not solve all problems of ecological damage 
assessment.94  Recently, a Temporary Assessment Rule for 
Pollution Damage Caused by Environmental Accidents was 
published by the MEP, and was made available for consultation 
with related public authorities and environmental research 
institutes.95  It establishes procedures for responding, assessing, 
and restoring pollution damage caused by sudden accidents.  How 
this rule will be finalized and implemented still waits to be seen. 
e. Access to the Court for Victims 
The Civil Procedure Law (CPL)96 in China prescribes the 
conditions for a case to be accepted by the court.  Article 108 
states: 
The following requirements must be met when an action is 
initiated:  
(1) the plaintiff must be an individual, legal person or any other 
organization that has a direct interest in the case; 
(2) there must be a specific defendant; 
(3) there must be a concrete claim, facts and cause of action; and  
(4) the action must be within the scope of acceptance for civil 
lawsuits of the people’s courts and within the jurisdiction of 
the people’s court where it is filed.97 
This provision defines the plaintiff narrowly as the one who 
has a direct interest in the case.  This constrained standing 
 
MEP.  It has not approved though the formal legislation procedure and is not a 
legally binding document. 
 94. Since it is not legally binding, judges are still free to choose the method 
they regard as appropriate.  To what extent the Recommendation has important 
practical implications is still waiting to be seen. 
 95. MINISTRY OF ENVTL. PROT., TEMPORARY ASSESSMENT RULE FOR POLLUTION 
DAMAGE CAUSED BY ENVIRONMENTAL ACCIDENTS (Consultation Draft), available 
at http://www.zhb.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgth/201301/t20130128_245592.htm (China). 
 96. [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by 
the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991, revised Oct. 29, 
2007 and Aug. 31, 2012) [hereinafter CPL], available at http://china.findlaw.cn/ 
jingjifa/shewaifalv/swflfg/20110414/91492.html (China).  Note that this English 
version is only updated to include the 2007 revisions, not the 2012 revisions.  
However, as far as Article 108 is concerned, the 2007 and 2012 versions are 
identical. 
 97. Id. art. 108. 
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makes it possible that a plaintiff will be denied access to the court 
if he cannot show direct physical or economic damage.98  Thus an 
important hurdle exists when there is no individual damage 
involved in pollution incidents.  This problem may be remedied by 
the newly revised CPL, which allows for public interest 
litigation.99  Two drafts to revise the CPL were submitted to the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for 
discussion in November 2011 and April 2012.100  The revision was 
finally promulgated in August 2012.  The first draft added a 
public interest litigation provision, stating: “[I]f an activity which 
pollutes the environment or violates many consumers’ rights 
composes an infringement on the public interest, related public 
authorities or social organizations can file litigation.”101  Such a 
provision opens a possibility for public authorities and NGOs to 
file a lawsuit when there is no individual damage involved.  
However, this provision in the first draft was criticized as too 
obscure and was narrowed in the final revision.102  The final law 
provides that: “[I]f environmental pollution and activities 
infringing on many consumers’ legal rights harm public interests, 
the authorities and organizations prescribed by law can bring a 
suit in the people’s court.”103  In this case, public authorities and 
NGOs may bring a claim for ecological damage that concerns the 
public interest.  However, the provision limits standing to the 
parties that are prescribed by law.104  This means that a party 
 
 98. Alford & Shen, supra note 15, at 147; Adam Briggs, China’s Pollution 
Victims: Still Seeking a Dependable Remedy, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 305, 
327 (2006). 
 99. The CPL was revised in 2012 and came into force on January 1, 2013. 
[The Decision to Revise the People’s Republic of China Civil Procedure Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2012, 
effective Jan. 1, 2013) [hereinafter CPL Revision], available at http://www.gov. 
cn/flfg/2012-09/01/content_2214662.htm (China).  See China Amends Civil 
Procedure Law, CHINA.ORG.CN, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2012-08/31/ 
content_26392562.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2014). 
 100. [First Draft Amendment to the Civil Procedure Law], Nat’l People’s Cong. 
(Oct. 29, 2011) [hereinafter CPL Draft 1], available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/ 
npc/xinwen/syxw/2011-10/29/content_1678367.htm (China). 
 101. CPL Draft 1, pt. 8. 
 102. CPL Revision, pt. 9. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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can file a case in court only if authorized explicitly by statute.105  
For example, under the MEPL, the public authorities in charge of 
marine environmental supervision and management can claim 
for losses if there is damage to the marine ecosystem, to marine 
fishery resources, or to the marine protected areas.106  However, 
in other areas where there is no such specific legislation, standing 
still constitutes a significant hurdle.107 
When standing or other requirements for accepting a case are 
not satisfied, the court can issue a verdict to reject the case 
according to Article 112 of the CPL: 
When a people’s court receives a bill of complaint or an oral 
complaint and after review finds that it meets the requirements 
for acceptance, [it shall file the case] within seven days and notify 
the parties; if the complaint does not meet the requirements for 
acceptance, the court shall, within seven days, order that the 
complaint be rejected. If the complainant has an objection 
against the order, he or she may file an appeal.108 
This provision, in theory, requires a verdict if the court 
decides not to accept a case.  In other words, the refusal of a case 
is supposed to be accompanied by a written rationale, which gives 
the plaintiff the possibility to appeal such a decision.109  However, 
judges often skip this step in practice.110 
The limited standing under the CPL, the conservative 
attitude towards public interest litigation, and the arbitrariness 
existing in accepting cases have led to heated discussions in 
literature on the topic.111  In addition to the provision on public 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. MEPL, art. 90. 
 107. As explained infra, the new revised CPL provision still needs the 
authorities and organizations to be “prescribed by law.”  If there is no legislation 
to authorize the authorities or organizations, then the standing difficulty is 
unresolved. 
 108. CPL, art. 112. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Rachel Stern, From Dispute to Decision: Suing Polluters in China, 206 
CHINA Q. 294, 297 (2011); for details see supra part II.A.c. 
 111. See, e.g., Christine J. Lee, “Pollute First, Control Later” No More: 
Combating Environmental Degradation in China Through an Approach Based 
in Public Interest Litigation and Public Participation, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 
795, 814 (2008); Alex Wang, The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in 
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interest litigation, the revised CPL has another provision aimed 
at protecting the plaintiff’s right to sue.112  It revises Article 112 
of the CPL by adding one sentence, stating: “[T]he Court should 
protect the parties’ right to sue according to law.”113  It further 
clarifies that “if the requirements for accepting a case are not 
satisfied, the court shall make a written verdict to reject the 
case.”114  Compared to the existing provisions, the revision 
explicitly requires that the verdict rejecting a case should be 
written, so that the parties’ right to appeal can be better 
protected.115 
B. Practice 
From the outset it should be stated that, unfortunately, there 
is overwhelming evidence of the dire state of the environment in 
China.116  In a recent study, Nagle reports that two-thirds of the 
360 million urban residences in China suffer from unhealthy 
levels of air pollution, that serious pollution of the surface waters 
exists in China, and that China is now the largest emitter of 
carbon dioxide in the world.117  In this part, we will examine how 
compensation for environmental damage works in practice in 
China.  We look both at liability for traditional damage, and at 
ecological damage. 
a. Who Acts After An Incident? 
After an environmental incident occurs or pollution is 
detected, the first issue that arises is whether an investigation 
 
China: Recent Developments, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 220 (2007).  See generally 
Briggs, supra note 98; Stern, supra note 110. 
 112. CPL Revision, pt. 29. 
 113. CPL Revision, pt. 29. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Sometimes the court refuses to accept a case without giving a written 
verdict.  Without such a verdict, the plaintiff cannot prove that he has already 
tried to file a case in the court, and this right to litigation may be endangered.  
However, the new revised CPL requires a written verdict, hence the plaintiff can 
have such proof. 
 116. See generally THE WORLD BANK, supra note 1. 
 117. See John Copeland Nagle, How Much Should China Pollute?, 12 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 591, 591-92 (2011). 
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and cleanup is taken, rather than compensation.  Especially, 
when there is only damage to the environment, but no individual 
loss, cleanup or restoration is an important step towards damage 
assessment and compensation.118 
It may not be surprising that the interviews we held all 
confirmed that the most important player in demanding 
restoration after environmental pollution is the government.119  
Historically many enterprises involved in heavy industry were—
and to a large extent still are—State-owned enterprises.120  This 
may have disadvantages when it comes to the incentives of public 
authorities to “go harsh” on polluters, but it also leads to an 
acceptance that the government may be responsible for historic 
pollution, and therefore, it may be the primary party who should 
take action to clean up especially historically polluted sites.121  
When referring to the government in China, this can either be the 
central government or the local authorities, depending upon the 
division of competences.  However, usually the government only 
takes cleanup action in response to emergency situations; longer-
term restoration does not take place.122 
However, there may be situations in which the government 
will attempt to shift costs to polluters.  The State Council 
initiated a policy entitled “from two to three.”123  Policymakers 
advocated for changing Chinese industry from a heavy secondary 
industry to a less polluting tertiary industry.124  This policy 
entails identifying soil pollution after the industry is relocated, 
and restoring the soil quality given the changing use of the 
site.125  In some cases, local governments undertake the 
 
 118. Restoration has been widely accepted as the primary instrument to 
assess natural resources/ecological damage.  See generally Cross 1989, supra 
note 85; Cross 1993, supra note 85; Kanner & Nagy, supra note 85. 
 119. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Interview with a Representative, Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP), in Beijing, China (Aug. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with MEP Rep.] 
(on file with authors). 
 122. See Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30. 
 123. Interview with MEP Rep., supra note 121. 
 124. Id. 
 125. JIAN XIE & FASHENG LI, THE WORLD BANK, OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT 
SITUATION ON BROWNFIELD REMEDIATION AND REDEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 4-5 
(2010), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/ 
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restoration themselves and pass on the restoration costs in the 
land transfer fees, or in the alternative, require the redevelopers 
(to whom the land use rights have been transferred) to restore 
costs under the government’s supervision.126  The restoration at 
the Beijing Hongshi Paint Plant site provides a good illustration.  
That site once housed a pesticide plant that was later 
transformed into a paint plant.  Site assessment showed that the 
contaminated soil amounted to 140,000 cubic meters.127  
Following the plant’s relocation, the government asked for bids 
for its redevelopment.  During the bidding process, the winning 
bidder is required to prepare and implement a restoration plan in 
accordance with the contaminated soil disposal plan, as 
formulated by the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau.  As 
a result, the developers spent tens of millions RMB on soil 
remediation.128 
This flexibility allows the government to use administrative 
law to require the polluter to conduct more risk assessment and 
to cleanup the sediment.129  This option also means that the 
nature of the remedies used in practice, specifically in soil 
pollution cases, are often more administrative130 or economic131 
in nature than classic tort law remedies.132  The remedies applied 
in practice will be further discussed below.133 
SWPPL is a statute that expressly allows public authorities 
to take responsive action to pollution.  Article 55 provides: 
An entity that discharges hazardous wastes shall dispose 
hazardous wastes according to relevant provisions of the State, 
and shall not dump or pile up them without approval; those that 
[do not] treat hazardous wastes shall be ordered to get right 
within the time limit by the environmental protection 
 
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/11/18/000333037_20101118233821/Rendere
d/PDF/579530ESW0P1191se0situation0EN0Full.pdf. 
 126. Interview with MEP Rep., supra note 121. 
 127. XIE & LI, supra note 125, at 23. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Interview with MEP Rep., supra note 121. 
 130. Id. (discussing forcing polluters to restore the polluted environment). 
 131. See id. (discussing passing on cleanup costs to the developer of the site). 
 132. See generally TLL. 
 133. See infra part II.B.f. 
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administrative departments of the people’s governments at or 
above the county level; if an entity fails to treat within the time 
limit or in accordance with relevant provisions of the State, 
another entity shall be commissioned to carry out the treatment 
by the environmental protection administrative departments of 
the people’s governments at or above the county level, and the 
expenses incurred therefrom shall be undertaken by the entity 
that discharges hazardous wastes.134 
This provision allows the agencies to independently treat the 
waste and redirect any incurred costs to the polluter.135  
However, China’s government may not be willing to apply this 
provision for fear that collecting costs from polluters will be too 
difficult.136 
This first item, being who usually takes action in case of 
damage to the environment, already shows a few typical features 
of the compensation system in China.  Given the historic 
responsibility of State-owned enterprises (SOEs), the 
government’s role is well-defined.137  Second, public authorities, 
realizing that it may be difficult to recover costs from polluters, 
may be unwilling to accept such measures.138  Third, public 
authorities will usually target emergency measures or new 
development possibilities of the polluted sites rather than long-
term environmental protection goals.139  Fourth, original 
remedies have been historically sought, including passing costs 
on to developers.140  Historically, more attention has been given 
to water and air pollution, while soil pollution, which often 
manifests itself only after decades, especially when the polluted 
sites are not redeveloped, is largely neglected.141  The seriousness 
 
 134. SWPPL, art. 55. 
 135. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89. 
 138. A big market may be created by the soil restoration, but three obstacles 
prevent its development.  See [Soil Restoration May Accelerate A Huge Market, 
But Three Obstacles Prevent Its Development], CHINESE DAILY ECON. NEWS 
(July 29, 2013), http://money.163.com/13/0729/02/94TRP0TA00253B0H.html 
(China). 
 139. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89. 
 140. Interview with MEP Rep., supra note 121. 
 141. Id. 
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of China’s soil pollution situation has only recently gained public 
attention.142  In cases where contaminated sites have been 
remediated, there is often wide media coverage and 
redevelopment.  For example, the remediation at the sites for the 
Shanghai 2010 Expo, the Beijing No. 3 Chemical Plant, and the 
Beijing Hongtushi Paint Plant gained expansive public 
attention.143 
b. Dispute Resolution 
An environmental accident may lead to contentious disputes 
between polluters and victims, and the manner in which to 
resolve such disputes is an important issue.  Liability rules 
discussed in the theoretical part of this article are mainly 
relevant when a dispute ends up in court.  However, in practice, 
only a small fraction of disputes actually reach the court.144 
Literature demonstrates that a three-step procedure is 
involved when citizens develop grievances and claims from 
accidents.145  The citizens first identify the accidents (naming); 
then attribute them to other parties (blaming); and finally seek 
remedies from those parties (shaming).146  When citizens suffer 
grievances (losses), they initially attempt to negotiate with the 
blamed party.  If negotiation fails, a small percentage of citizens 
will involve third parties to seek a remedy.147  In China, such a 
remedy could be either a legal or a political action (including 
complaints and petitions to enforcement authorities, petitions to 
higher levels of government, media involvement and collective 
actions).148  Of the two options, parties do not often seek legal 
 
 142. See generally XIE & LI, supra note 125. 
 143. XIE & LI, supra note 125, at 5. 
 144. Zhao, supra note 12, at 174. 
 145. William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of 
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 635-37 (1980). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Jun Ma, The Rise of Social Accountability in China, 71 AUSTL. J. PUB. 
ADMIN. 111, 113 (2012); Benjamin van Rooij, The People vs. Pollution: 
Understanding Citizen Action Against Pollution in China, 19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 
55, 57 (2010) (explaining that a lot of recent literature has focused on how 
victims and the public act against pollution in China) [hereinafter van Rooij, 
The People vs. Pollution], available at http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/People_ 
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action.149  It is reported that there were 4453, 1545 and 2136 civil 
litigations against polluters in 2004, 2005, and 2006, 
respectively.150  In 2006, the Environmental Protection Bureau 
received 616,122 pollution-related complaints and petitions from 
citizens.151  Reasons for Chinese citizens’ unwillingness to use 
legal action for solving pollution disputes include cultural 
characteristics152 and institutional and practical barriers to 
litigation.153  Even when the cases finally reach the court, the 
vulnerability of judges to political pressure, uncertainty about the 
law, and political ambiguity make the trial a complicated 
procedure, with varying degrees of legal formality and judicial 
autonomy.154 
Mediation is another formal option for pollution victims to 
seek a remedy.  There are three types of mediation from which 
victims can choose.155  The victims can go to the People’s 
Mediation Committees at the local level, which are known as 
“Residents’ Committees” in urban areas and “Villagers’ 
Committees” in rural areas.156  Often, these committees solve the 
disputes between township/community enterprises, solely-owned 
workshops, and their neighbors.157  However, concerns exist 
 
vs_pollution_China.pdf.  See generally Peter Ho, Greening Without Conflict? 
Environmentalism, Green NGOs and Civil Society in China, 32 DEV. & CHANGE 
893 (2001); BRYAN TILT, THE STRUGGLE FOR SUSTAINABILITY IN RURAL CHINA: 
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES AND CIVIL SOCIETY (2010) (providing an in-depth 
analysis on people’s action in rural areas); Benjamin van Rooij et al., The 
Compensation Trap: The Limits of Community-Based Pollution Regulation in 
China, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 701 (2012) [hereinafter van Rooij, The 
Compensation Trap], available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/ 
iss3/2. 
 149. van Rooij, The People vs. Pollution, supra note 148, at 61-62. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. at 63-6  (stating that the “level of income, education, dependency 
on the polluting source for income, and organization” are all obstacles 
preventing the citizens from going to court to seek a remedy for the harm they 
have suffered from pollution). 
 153. See infra part II.B.c. 
 154. See generally Rachel E. Stern, On the Frontlines: Making Decisions in 
Chinese Civil Environmental Lawsuits, 32 LAW & POL’Y 79 (2010), available at 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/1788. 
 155. See Zhao, supra note 12, at 162-64. 
 156. Id. at 162. 
 157. Id. 
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about the quality of the mediators, the balance in the 
compromise, and the legal basis, as well as the enforcement of 
mediated agreements.158  A second possibility for the victim is to 
seek administrative mediation in the Environmental Protection 
Bureaus (EPBs) or other public authorities.159  This option is 
supposedly a faster and more efficient solution than litigation.160  
While some cases show such advantages in practice, other cases 
demonstrate the reluctance of public authorities to resolve 
pollution disputes.161  One explanation is the lack of financial or 
human resources of EPBs and the lack of binding force of the 
mediation outcome.162  A third option is court-provided judicial 
mediation; however, this option is sometimes criticized for the 
strong role given to the judges at the expense of accurately 
reflecting the opinions of the parties in dispute.163 
c. Barriers to Access to Justice 
Theory demonstrates that with traditional damage, victims 
have standing in the court, and some legal designs try to relieve 
their burdens, such as the reversal of the burden of proof.164  
However, in practice, barriers often prevent effective victims from 
obtaining adequate compensation.  The most important barrier 
remains whether the court will accept the case.165  In a Chinese 
court, the filing division (li’an ting) determines the acceptance of 
a case.166  As discussed supra, according to the CPL, the judges 
have to render a verdict if a case is rejected.167  However, in 
practice, this step is often skipped, thus leaving the plaintiffs 
without a record of refusal.168  In practice, a case may be rejected, 
because an administrative solution is forthcoming, or because law 
 
 158. Id. at 163-64. 
 159. Zhao, supra note 12, at 164. 
 160. See id. at 166. 
 161. See id. at 166-70. 
 162. See id. at 169. 
 163. Id. at 170. 
 164. See infra part II.A.c. 
 165. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30. 
 166. Stern, supra note 12, at 22. 
 167. See infra part II.A.e. 
 168. Stern, supra note 110, at 297. 
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is not regarded as a proper solution for that dispute.169  It is even 
more problematic when cases are politically sensitive.170  One 
example where the court refused to accept the environmental 
case without a written verdict is a petro-chemical case, involving 
PetroChina.171  Due to an operational defect in 2005, an explosion 
occurred at a petro-chemical plant owned by PetroChina 
Corporation.172  This explosion and consequent emergency 
measures led to a large amount of toxic substances spilled into 
the Songhua River.173  This led to a temporary water supply 
shortage in Harbin City, and a direct economic loss up to 1.5 
billion RBM.174  Apart from direct economic loss, the incident led 
to a significant ecological loss.175  However, the constrained 
standing provision in the CPL created a challenge for claims for 
such loss.176  After this environmental incident, some experts 
filed a civil public interest litigation with nature as a joint-
plaintiff in the High People’s Court of Heilongjiang.177  However, 
according to Chinese law, nature does not have standing, and the 
experts did not suffer a direct loss.  Hence, the court did not 
accept the case.178 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Interview with Kathinka Fürst, Researcher for Amsterdam University, 
Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims, in Beijing, China (Aug. 23, 
2011) (on file with authors). 
 171. Wang Canfa, Pondering Over the Incident of Songhua River Pollution 
from the Perspective of Environmental Law, in CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 291 
(Michael Faure & Song Ying eds., 2008). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Wang Jin & Huang Chiachen, Reflections from the Transboundary 
Pollution of Songhua River, in CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITY: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 273-74 (Michael 
Faure & Song Ying eds., 2008). 
 174. Wang, supra note 171, at 291. 
 175. See generally UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM, THE SONGHUA 
RIVER SPILL CHINA, DECEMBER 2005: FIELD MISSION REPORT (2005), available at 
http://www.unep.org/PDF/China_Songhua_River_Spill_draft_7_301205.pdf 
(offering an overview of pollution’s impact on the Songhua River). 
 176. According to the CPL, the plaintiff should have a direct interest involved 
in the case.  See CPL, art. 108(1).  However, ecological damage concerns the 
general public, but not individuals.  Hence, obstacles exist when the individual 
tries to assert a claim on behalf to the environment. 
 177. Wang & Huang, supra note 173, at 273-74. 
 178. Id. at 301. 
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Another hurdle for victims to overcome before going to court 
is the acceptance fee system.  According to the CPL, when parties 
file a civil litigation, they pay an acceptance fee.179  The fee 
variation for plaintiffs is usually 0.5% to 4% of the compensation 
requested.180  This can be costly for the victims who have already 
suffered serious harm.  Although the law allows an application 
for a reduction, waiver, or postponed payment of the fee,181 the 
reliance on such fees for the court’s operational budget creates 
disincentives to grant waivers.182  Lawyers are rarely inclined to 
apply for waivers out of concern that a waiver will bias the judges 
to their client’s disadvantage.183 
Even in a situation in which the court agrees to hear the 
plaintiff’s case, a plaintiff may still face substantial problems.  
Specifically, defendants generally possess great industrial, 
economic, and political power.  Moreover, judges are 
inexperienced in handling pollution cases.  Thus, a plaintiff’s 
chance of winning is substantially reduced.184 
A pollution incident may cause damage to a large number of 
victims.  The CPL provides that if one or more parties, involving 
two or more individuals, bring an action of comparable subject 
matter, the separate lawsuits can be tried together as a class 
action.185  Class actions make litigation more efficient and create 
wide publicity of the lawsuit, thus making it easier for the victims 
to obtain a remedy.186  However, in practice, there is a trend to 
restrict the use of class actions.  In 2005, the Supreme People’s 
Court issued a Notice Regarding Problems with the Acceptance of 
Class Action Lawsuits by the People’s Courts, which limits the 
number of class action suits.187  Specifically, courts are given the 
 
 179. CPL, art. 107. 
 180. Moser & Yang, supra note 4, at 10897. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See Briggs, supra note 98, at 327. 
 184. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30. 
 185. CPL, art. 53, 54. 
 186. See Zhao, supra note 12, at 176-77. 
 187. [Notice regarding Problems with the Acceptance of Class Action Lawsuits 
by the People’s Courts] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 30, 200 , 
effective Jan. 1, 2006), available at http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/fgkd/xfg/ 
sfwj/200904/20090400132228.shtml (China); see Wang, supra note 111, at 215. 
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discretion to divide class action suits if the case would present too 
many difficulties.188  Moreover, the notice redirects jurisdiction 
over class action suits to a lower level.  Recently, courts have 
been inclined to split up class actions in order to increase the 
charged court fee and the number of cases.189  Since large class 
actions are more likely to draw wide media coverage and attract 
attention from higher-level authorities, the courts prefer dealing 
with these cases on an individual basis in order to avoid bad 
publicity.190  However, solving cases at a local level may 
strengthen the effects of local protectionism.191 
Additionally, there may be genuine problems in proving the 
environmental claims of the victim.  Victims of environmental 
damage face traditional problems such as providing proof of the 
damage and proving proximate cause.192  According to Article 66 
of the TLL, the burden of proof of exemptions and causation is 
shifted to the polluter.193  However, experts have reported that, 
in practice, proving causation remains a problem.  The reversal of 
proof existed in Chinese law before the promulgation of the 
TLL.194  In practice, it was not fully implemented—before the 
judges decided to shift the burden of proof to the polluters, they 
sometimes required a different degree of preliminary proof from 
the plaintiffs.195  In order to shift the burden, the court could 
require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was polluting the 
environment.196  In other cases, the victims are required to 
 
 188. van Rooij, The People vs. Pollution, supra note 148, at 69. 
 189. Zhao, supra note 12, at 177. 
 190. See id. 
 191. van Rooij, The People vs. Pollution, supra note 148, at 69. 
 192. Id.; Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30. 
 193. See infra part II.A.c. 
 194. See [Supreme People’s Court Opinion on Several Issues Concerning the 
Application of the Civil Procedure Law] Sup. People’s Ct. (promulgated July 1 , 
1992, effective July 14, 1992), art. 74, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/ 
display.aspx?lib=law&id=6690&CGid= (China) (“Parties in a litigation should 
provide proof for his claims.  However, in the following tort cases, if the 
defendant denies the facts asserted by the plaintiff, the burden of proof lies with 
the defendant: . . . claims for damages caused by environmental pollution . . . .”). 
 195. Moser & Yang, supra note 4, at 10897. 
 196. See Joseph McMullin, Comment, Do Chinese Environmental Laws Work? 
A Study of Litigation as a Response to the Problem of Fishery Pollution in China, 
26 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 142, 168-71 (2009). 
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produce preliminary evidence that shows “it is more likely than 
not that the defendant polluted the environment and caused the 
victim harm.”197  A lower burden scenario requires the 
satisfaction of three criteria: “[(1)] the plaintiff has suffered a 
quantifiable loss; [(2)] this harm has been proven to be caused by 
pollution and [(3)] in the relevant temporal and physical space 
there is a possible source of this environmental pollution.”198  In 
some extreme cases, the victims are asked to provide direct 
evidence that the harm was caused by pollution.199  This variance 
in practice shows that without clear criteria for determining 
causation, and practical guidance on applying the burden of proof, 
a simple provision reversing the burden of proof cannot guarantee 
its implementation. 
d. NGOs 
The above analysis shows the difficulties for individual 
victims to resort to judicial protection.  Hence, one may expect a 
positive role for NGOs, which can assist the individual victims to 
make claims for traditional damage, and can also get involved 
when only ecological damage is concerned. 
In China, environmental NGOs (eNGOs) are still in their 
early stages of development.200  In 1978, the China Society for 
Environmental Sciences established the first eNGO in China.201  
Finally in the 1990s, eNGOs began to develop more rapidly.202  
Reports indicate that there were 2768 eNGOs in China in 2005, 
and the number grew to 3539 in 2008.203  According to scholars, 
changes in political opportunities, mobilized organizational 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. McMullin, supra note 196, at 168-71. 
 199. Id. 
 200. The eNGOs only started to develop rapidly in China after 1994.  The 
number of eNGOs has increased significantly; however, there is still a heavy 
dependency on the government, and they function quite differently from western 
eNGOs.  See generally Bao Maohong, Environmental NGOs in Transforming 
China, 4 NATURE & CULTURE 1 (2009). 
  201. Id. at 2. 
 202. Id. at 2-3. 
 203. Zhan Xueyong & Tang Shui-Yan, Political Opportunities, Resource 
Constraints and Policy Advocacy of Environmental NGOs in China, 91 PUB. 
ADMIN. 2, 4 (2011). 
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resources, the influence of international communications, the 
Internet, and media fueled the rapid rise in eNGO growth.204  
Nevertheless, substantial obstacles bar eNGOS from reaching full 
prosperity.  For example, eNGOs face strict legal and 
administrative barriers, which make their legitimacy a serious 
concern.205  Estimates show that only 23.3% of the eNGOs are 
registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs and therefore, the 
remainder are illegal.206  Of those registered, only a small 
fraction are registered as social organizations with tax-exemption 
status; other eNGOs are registered as private non-profit 
organizations, corporations, or student-led social organizations.207  
Since many of the eNGOs are government-organized (GONGOs), 
the government is influential in their establishment.208  In 2009, 
among the 2768 eNGOs in China, 49.9% were GONGOs, 40.3% 
were student-led organizations, 2.5% were branches of 
international NGOs, and only 7.3% were grassroots (citizen-
organized) NGOs.209  This governmental characteristic, coupled 
with the political and institutional backgrounds, make eNGOs 
reluctant to take confrontational action.210  The majority of their 
efforts target promoting environmental consciousness, 
sustainable development and public participation.211  Since 95% 
of eNGOs practice under the principle of “help, but not make 
trouble; participate, but not intervene; supervise, but not replace; 
act, but not violate,”212 few eNGOs try to help pollution victims 
through lawsuits and challenges to local firms.213  Recently, 
however, eNGOs have begun playing a larger role in the domain 
of policy advocacy.  Such roles include helping victims file 
 
 204. Id. at 14; Yang Guobin, Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics 
in China, 181 CHINA Q. 46, 47 (2005).  See generally Jiang Ru & Leonard 
Ortolano, Development of Citizen-Organized Environmental NGOs in China, 20 
VOLUNTAS 141 (2009). 
 205. Bao, supra note 200, at 7-8. 
 206. Id. at 7. 
 207. Zhan & Tang, supra note 203, at 36. 
 208. See Bao, supra note 200, at 7. 
 209. Bao, supra note 200, at 7; see generally Ru & Ortolano, supra note 204. 
 210. See Bao, supra note 200, at 8. 
 211. Id. at 5-6. 
 212. Id. at 8. 
 213. Id. 
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lawsuits, challenging local firms, and influencing the function of 
the State.214  For instance, some eNGOs provide legal aid to 
pollution victims and support them in lawsuits against 
polluters.215  The Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims 
(CLAPV) is such an organization.216  CLAPV reportedly received 
over 10,000 complaints from citizens during its eight years of 
operation, and got directly involved in 104 of them.217 
In addition to supporting individuals to file a lawsuit against 
polluters, eNGOs recently started to file public interest litigation 
on their own behalf.  For example, the All China Environment 
Federation, a large GONGO in China, reportedly filed four public 
environmental litigations in 2011, two of which were successful, 
and the remainders are still pending.218  The case, All China 
Environment Federation v. Jiangsu Jiangyin Container, Inc., was 
their first environmental civil public litigation to be accepted by 
the court.219 
ENGOs’ increasing role in environmental litigation is in line 
with the introduction of the environmental court in some local 
and intermediate courts in recent years.220  It is reported that 
there are eighty-six environmental courts at different levels in 
China as of October 2011,221 of which the environmental courts in 
 
 214. Yan Rooij, The People vs. Pollution, supra note 148, at 70. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See generally China Environment Federation, [2011 China Environment 
Federation Environmental Activist Services Briefing], NETEASE (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://gongyi.163.com/12/0213/11/7Q504CLB00933KC8.html (China). 
 219. See generally [Following China’s First Environmental Public Interest 
Litigation: Towards Constitutional “Environmental Rights”], CHINANEWS (Nov. 
28, 2009), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2009/11-28/1989095.shtml 
(China). 
 220. Some environmental courts have opened the possibility for NGOs to bring 
public interest litigation.  See GAO JIE, NATURAL. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, CHINA 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROJECT, DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL COURTS IN 
CHINA: THE PROMISES AND CHALLENGES AND IMPLEMENTATION FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION (2009), available at http://www. 
iucnael.org/zh/component/search/?searchword=environmental+court&ordering=
&searchphrase=all. 
 221. Minchun Zhang & Bao Zhang, Specialized Environmental Courts in 
China: Status Quo, Challenges and Responses, 30 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES 
L. 361, 361 (2012). 
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the intermediate courts of Guiyang, Wuxi, and Kunming are the 
most reported.222  Those courts have issued some documents to 
guide the scope of the cases that the environmental courts shall 
accept.  Some have mentioned specifically that eNGOs are eligible 
plaintiffs to file public interest litigations.223  These documents 
alleviate the legal obstacles for eNGOs to bring public litigation 
in some local courts.  However, a written rule alone cannot 
guarantee the sufficient involvement of eNGOs.224  Despite the 
rapid introduction of environmental courts nationwide, the 
caseload for these courts remains low, especially for pubic 
interest litigations brought by eNGOs.225  Moreover, courts 
remain cautious in accepting controversial cases against powerful 
defendants.226 
e. Quantifying Environmental Damage 
A major problem identified by experts is that technical 
information, as well as legal norms to adopt an appropriate 
evaluation of environmental damage, are often lacking.  For 
example, environmental impact assessment studies provide de 
facto little information on the background level of environmental 
health (like epidemiological surveys).  When background levels 
are lacking, it becomes obviously difficult to evaluate to what 
extent emissions from a particular industry would have 
 
 222. See generally GAO, supra note 220. 
 223. See generally GAO, supra note 220. 
 224. See generally Darcey J. Goelz, China’s Environmental Problems: Is a 
Specialized Court the Solution?, 18 PAC. RIM  L. & POL’Y  J. 155 (2009); Alex L. 
Wang & Gao Jie, Environmental Courts and the Development of Environmental 
Public Interest Litigation in China, 3 J. CT. INNOVATION 37 (2010) (noting that in 
spite of the rapid establishment of environmental courts in recent years, many 
scholars are cautious about the potential achievement of such instruments). 
 225. Wang & Gao, supra note 224, at 42. 
 226. Although legislation and practice have begun to open up space for public 
interest litigation, literature holds that the actual effect of this new type of 
litigation is still moderate.  See generally Jingjing Liu, Environmental Justice 
with Chinese Characteristics: Recent Developments in Using Environmental 
Public Interest Litigation to Strengthen Access to Environmental Justice, 7 FLA. 
A & M U.L. REV. 229 (2012). 
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contributed to the harm.227  When it comes to quantifying the 
damage to the environment itself, it is even more difficult.  With 
the exception of assessing the fishery losses caused by water 
pollution,228 the standards on how to assess damages are usually 
missing.  For example, the problem associated with soil pollution 
is not only that prior information on background levels is missing, 
but also that appropriate standards are lacking.229  In China, 
technologies concerning the restoration of polluted sites are to a 
large extent still being developed, and have only been brought to 
the market in recent years.230  In response to this situation, the 
government has begun developing methodologies to assess pure 
environmental damage, and has recently commenced trials in 
some areas.231 
f. Remedies 
As discussed earlier, the Chinese legal framework allows 
different types of remedies for pollution victims,232 which can be 
divided into two large categories: (1) compensation; and (2) 
elimination of harm.  The category of “elimination of harm” 
includes cessation of infringement, elimination of danger, and 
restoration to original status.233  Cessation of infringement is an 
injunction to stop an ongoing infringing action; elimination of 
danger stops an action that substantially threatens the 
environment; and restoration remediates the polluted 
 
 227. Interview with Ms. Ma, South China Institute of Environmental Sciences, 
in Guangzhou, China (Aug. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with Ms. Ma] (on 
file with authors). 
 228. [Rules on Calculating Fishery Losses from Water Pollution Accidents] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Agric., Oct. 8, 1996, effective Oct. 8, 1996) 
[hereinafter 1996 Rules on Calculating Fishery Losses], available at 
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=12796 (China). 
 229. For example, standards to evaluate the level of restoration for a polluted 
site.  See Interview with Dr. Cai, South China Institute of Environmental 
Sciences, in Guangzhou, China (Aug. 11, 2011) (on file with authors). 
 230. See id. 
 231. See [Opinions on Evaluating Environmental Pollution Damage], 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Envtl. Prot., May 25, 2011) [hereinafter 
Opinions on Environmental Pollution Damage], available at http://www.mep. 
gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bwj/201105/t20110530_211357.htm (China). 
 232. See supra part II.A.d. 
 233. Zhao, supra note 12, at 187-88. 
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environment to its original status.234  However, in practice, 
judges are reluctant to order an injunction for several reasons.  
Some injunction orders, such as suspension or closing a factory, 
are usually regarded as political decisions, so the court rarely 
uses them without political commitment initiated by the 
government.235  Even if the court chooses to order an injunction, 
such as “cessation of infringement,” this is still too broad a 
concept to use in practice.  Without further clarifying how to 
accomplish such an injunction, it may still remain unenforced.236 
Another related issue is that sometimes economic 
alternatives are used instead of legal remedies.  In the early 
stages of environmental awareness, due to the difficulties of 
environmental litigation, the goals of plaintiffs were often to 
obtain compensation indirectly in terms of job opportunities, 
rather than monetary damages.237  This arrangement was 
intended to provide some social security.  In those instances, the 
question of quantification of damage did not arise.  However, it 
was indicated that with the development of the market economy 
and increasing environmental awareness, this type of socio-
economic compensation to victims may no longer work; in that 
case, quantification of damages becomes an important issue.238 
Remedies for pure environmental damage are even more 
problematic.  Environmental damage is not specifically addressed 
in legislation—with the exception of marine pollution—making it 
unclear whether there is an existing obligation to restore the 
environment, as well as how the damage should be 
compensated.239  As mentioned above, quantification of such 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. Zhao, supra note 12, at 188. 
 236. In Zhang Changjian et al. v. Pingan Rongping Chemical Plant, the 
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant caused serious damage to the biodiversity 
in the neighborhood, especially fishery losses to the villagers.  The court ordered 
the defendant to compensate the victims and to stop the infringement 
immediately without further clarifying the manner by which the defendant 
ought to comply.  Several years after the judgment, it was still unclear whether 
the defendant had taken any action in response to the order.  See Wang, supra 
note 111, at 212-17. 
 237. Interview with Ms. Ma, supra note 227. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See supra part II.A.a. 
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damage in this case is a major issue.240  But the MEP has 
launched an experiment in some provinces and cities with respect 
to environmental damage assessments, in order to gain 
experience, which could later be adopted as a comprehensive 
national system.241  According to the Recommendation on 
Methods of Assessing Environmental Damage, a restoration-based 
approach has been implemented to evaluate the pure 
environmental damage.242 
Use of a more socio-economic based approach to remedying 
environmental damage is still prevalent; this is especially 
noticeable in the case of soil pollution.  A restoration claim is 
usually incited by the relocation of old industries.  For instance, 
the relocation of hundreds of old industrial facilities from Beijing 
to the city outskirts left behind eight million square meters of 
brownfields in need of redevelopment.243  According to the Beijing 
EPB document, before industrial land is transformed to another 
use, an environmental impact assessment should be undertaken 
to determine the extent of the soil pollution, and the polluters 
should be held responsible for the cleanup.244  However, in 
practice, recovery from polluters according to the “polluter pays” 
principle is not always feasible.  The former industrial polluters 
may have ceased to exist or can no longer afford the costs. 
Furthermore, polluters are often SOEs, and therefore, the 
government has no strong incentive to pursue them.245  Instead of 
holding the SOEs liable, the government prefers to seek socio-
economic remedies from the polluters, such as requesting that 
they increase investitures to improve the local economy.246  The 
government also seeks institutional arrangements for 
redevelopment where new developers pay a higher price for the 
development project or are required to undertake restoration 
 
 240. Id. 
 241. See Opinions on Environmental Pollution Damage, supra note 231. 
 242. See supra part II.A.d. 
 243. XIE & LI, supra note 125, at 4. 
 244. See [Notice of the Beijing Environmental Protection Agency on 
Evaluation of the Soil Environment at Former Industrial Sites] (promulgated by 
Beijing Envtl. Prot. Bureau, July 6, 2007) (China). 
 245. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89; Interview with MEP Rep., 
supra note 121. 
 246. See Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89. 
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themselves.247  One example is the restoration of the Beijing 
Hongshi Paint Plant site.248  The legal basis for these transfers is 
that all land is state-owned or collectively owned, and that the 
industry only has a use-right of the land.249  The government can 
require in the bidding document that the new developers 
receiving the land-use right take restoration measures.250 
C. Summary 
The theoretical possibilities for recovering environmental 
damages in China seem viable, especially since the new TLL 
reconfirmed a strict liability rule that was already incorporated in 
special legislation.  Moreover, a reversal of the burden of proving 
exceptions and the absence of causation should lead to conditions 
in favor of victims in future litigation.  However, it is clear that 
Chinese legislation regarding remedies for environmental harm 
pay more attention to direct economic losses than to pure 
environmental damage.  Acceptance procedures and a fee system 
also limit the ability of plaintiffs to receive access to justice. 
This was largely confirmed in interviews, which proved that 
in the case of environmental damage, it is often the government 
who obtains recoveries for environmental harm, and as discussed 
above, they do not have a strong incentive to pursue SOEs.  
NGOs currently play a limited role in litigation, given the huge 
barriers concerning access to justice, including formal statutory 
barriers, such as the court’s allowance of a case, and problems 
concerning the expertise and knowledge of the judiciary. 
Most remedies are of a socio-economic nature, for example, 
forcing polluting industries to reinvest in the local economy.  
There seems to be little focus on long-term restoration of the 
environment and providing individual restorative justice to 
victims; victims may even be paid off with relatively small 
amounts of compensation, thereby not providing incentives for 
 
 247. For some of the examples, see XIE & LI, supra note 125, at 21-27. 
 248. See supra part II.B.a. 
 249. George C.S. Lin & Samuel P.S. Ho, The State, Land System, and Land 
Development Processes in Contemporary China, 95 ANNALS ASS’N AM. 
GEOGRAPHERS 411, 420 (2005). 
 250. See, e.g., XIE & LI, supra note 125, at 21-27. 
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serious investments in preventive technologies.  The economic 
concept that environmental liability provides incentives for 
polluters to invest in efficient abatement technologies is based on 
the theory that potential polluters are exposed to the full social 
costs of their activity, and will hence be sufficiently deterred by a 
finding of liability.251  The overview of the practice shows that the 
probability of the polluter being held liable to pay damages is 
quite low; in fact, it is often not the polluter, but rather the new 
developer who is invited to compensate for the harm.  Moreover, 
the amount of paid compensation only seems to be a fraction of 
the true social losses caused by environmental harm.  It is 
therefore doubtful that, given the current practice, environmental 
liability can play a preventive role in China. 
III. INSURANCE 
This section details possibilities for the implementation of 
environmental insurance in China.  Given the limited scope of 
environmental liability,252 it is unsurprising that so far 
environmental insurance has not played a major role in China.  
However, if one were to allocate a greater role to liability 
mechanisms in providing compensation for environmental harm, 
the question arises as to what extent this liability can actually be 
covered by insurance.  This inquiry is important for victims who 
may otherwise be confronted with an insolvent—and hence 
judgment-proof—defendant.  The literature also indicates that 
insolvency will allow polluters to externalize the harm to society, 
which can lead to under-deterrence.253 
 
 251. See DETERRENCE, INSURABILITY, AND COMPENSATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITY: FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 18-50 (Michael 
Faure ed., 2003) (discussing the economic analysis of environmental liability). 
 252. See supra part II.C. 
 253. See generally Peter-J. Jost, Limited Liability and the Requirement to 
Purchase Insurance, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 259 (1996); Mattias K. Polborn, 
Mandatory Insurance and the Judgment-Proof Problem, 18 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 141 (1998). 
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A. Theory 
In this part we focus on the possibilities for polluters to 
obtain environmental insurance.  It focuses on general 
environmental insurance, not insurance for particular risks, such 
as marine oil pollution254 or for nuclear liability.255 
a. Statutory Background 
To what extent does a statutory duty exist to purchase 
liability insurance?  When the extent of the damage can exceed 
the individual wealth of the injurer, an insolvency problem may 
arise, justifying the introduction of mandatory insurance.256  The 
literature has largely argued in favor of the introduction of 
environmental liability insurance to guarantee both effective 
compensation to victims, and avoidance of under-deterrence 
resulting from the judgment-proof problem.257  General 
environmental statutes in China, including the new TLL of 
2009,258 are generally silent on compulsory insurance or other 
financial guarantees; exceptions only exist for marine oil 
pollution.259  Environmental insurance is a new product in China; 
only recently has the government started a policy to promote the 
development of the environmental insurance markets.  In 2007, 
the MEP and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission issued 
a document requiring local authorities to conduct research and 
 
 254. See infra part IV. 
 255. We do not discuss nuclear liability and its insurance in China in this 
contribution.  See generally Liu Jing & Michael Faure, Compensating Nuclear 
Damage in China, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 781 (2012). 
 256. When a serious insolvency risk exists, the insured only has incentives to 
buy insurance up to the amount of his or her assets, rather than for the entirety 
of the damage caused.  In this situation, compulsory insurance will make the 
insured internalize the entire costs created by him or her.  See Faure, supra note 
251, at 181-85; Gerhard Wagner, (Un)insurability and the Choice Between 
Market Insurance and Public Compensation Systems, in SHIFTS IN 
COMPENSATION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 110 (Willem H. van Boom 
& Michael Faure eds., 2007). 
 257. See MICHAEL G. FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, INSURANCE AND EXPANDING 
SYSTEMIC RISKS 211-20 (2003). 
 258. See infra part II.A.a. 
 259. See Faure & Hu, supra note 12, at 237. 
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experiments on environmental liability insurance.260  There are 
also a few voluntary environmental liability insurance programs 
promoted by some local governments.  In 2008 the city of 
Shenyang promulgated the first local regulation, Shenyang 
Regulation on Preventing Pollution from Dangerous Waste,261 
which is the first local regulation that touched upon 
environmental liability insurance in China.  Under this 
regulation, insurers are encouraged to establish products to cover 
environmental liability from dangerous waste, and potential 
polluters are encouraged to seek such coverage.262 
b. Theoretical Insurance Options263 
Insurance experts report that insurance coverage for 
environmental harm in China is theoretically possible on three 
bases.264  A general liability insurance policy is the first 
possibility to which enterprises can subscribe.  This type of 
general liability insurance focuses on industrial accidents, 
covering environmental damage related to bodily injury, property 
damage or even pure ecological losses.265  The broad definition of 
environmental liability can create difficulties when attempting to 
differentiate from liability caused by other industrial activities.266  
 
 260. See [Guidance on the Development of Environmental Pollution Liability 
Insurance] (promulgated by the Ministry of Envtl. Prot. & the China Ins. Reg. 
Comm’n, Dec.  , 2007), available at http://www.zhb.gov.cn/info/gw/huanfa/ 
200802/t20080220_118389.htm (China). 
 261. See Shenyang Regulation on Preventing Pollution from Dangerous Waste, 
supra note 67, art. 8. 
 262. Id. 
 263. We realize that this already touches upon practice.  However, in this part 
we describe the insurance policies that could theoretically cover environmental 
harm.  In part III.B infra, we discuss to what extent these policies are used in 
practice, and the problems that arise in that respect. 
 264. Interview with Mr. Christian Lahnstein, Munich Reinsurance Company, 
in Munich, Germany (Sept. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with Mr. Christian 
Lahnstein] (on file with authors). 
 265. General liability insurance is used broadly to cover environmental 
liability.  See BIO INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY DIRECTIVE (ELD) AND RELATED 
FINANCIAL SECURITY ISSUES, 53-54 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
environment/legal/liability/pdf/ELD%20Study%20November%202009.pdf. 
 266. Interview with Mr. Christian Lahnstein, supra note 264. 
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Therefore, the expert holds that a general liability insurance 
policy should cover, and hence cannot exclude pollution damage 
from its coverage.267  It is important to note that because general 
liability insurance only covers accidents, it excludes gradual 
pollution. 
A second possibility is coverage under product liability 
insurance.  Generally, a product liability policy does not 
discriminate between environmental damage and other 
damages.268  Many substances have the potential for far-reaching 
environmental harm, such as those related to food or agricultural 
products.  Even gradual pollution could be covered under this 
policy.269 
The third option involves specific environmental insurance 
policies, and as opposed to the first two options, does not focus 
exclusively on environmental harm.  These policies would cover 
third-party liability, rather than harm to the insured site 
itself.270  An environmental liability policy would likely cover 
liability for damage from the premises itself, as well as operations 
with defined extensions; this extends beyond the narrow coverage 
for industrial accidents under more traditional general liability 
insurance policies.271 
 
 267. Id. 
 268. Interview with Mr. Christian Lahnstein, supra note 264. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Specific environmental insurance is also broadly used in the United 
States and Europe.  See BIO INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, supra note 265, at 53-54; see 
also, Dan R. Anderson, Development of Environmental Liability Risk 
Management and Insurance in the United States: Lessons and Opportunities, 2 
RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 1, 11-14 (1998). 
 271. First-party insurance and liability insurance are two important types of 
insurance.  In the first-party insurance system, compensation is awarded 
directly by the insurer to the victim.  It is the victim who buys the insurance, 
and the insurer pays as soon as damage occurs, making the damage the insured 
risk.  See Michael Faure & Veronique Bruggeman, Catastrophic Risks and First-
party Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 11-14 (2008).  Liability insurance (third-
party insurance) covers claims of victims against injurers who are liable in 
damages.  See id. at 9.  So the covered risk in liability insurance is the insured’s 
liability for damage caused to other parties.  See Gerhard Wagner, Tort Law and 
Liability Insurance, in TORT, LAW AND ECONOMICS 377 (Michael Faure ed., 2009).  
Direct insurance has some similarity to first-party insurance and liability 
insurance.  In a direct insurance policy, the potential injurer who possesses a 
particular site additionally seeks insurance coverage for the benefit of third-
parties who could suffer damage resulting from that particular site.   Unlike the 
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B. Practice 
a. Insolvency Risk—Compulsory Insurance? 
The first issue of importance is that experts report that, in 
some cases, victims are unable to recover when the defendants 
declared bankruptcy.272  In that event, the government 
intervened and picked up the bill, thereby disincentivizing the 
polluter from increasing its own costs by buying insurance 
coverage.273  However, this may not be a problem in all pollution 
cases.  For example, an insolvency risk may not arise in the case 
of large SOEs.  It is also reported that because a stringent 
liability rule is lacking,274 industry has no incentive to demand 
liability insurance.275  To the extent that a judgment-proof 
problem arises, compulsory insurance—or at least a requirement 
of financial securities for selected industries that pose high 
pollution risks—could solve this problem.276 
There is some debate concerning the introduction of 
compulsory insurance.  At the policy level, the concern is that 
policymakers are attempting to introduce compulsory insurance 
while simultaneously forcing high-polluting industries to pay 
pollution fees.277  Some experts propose to assess environmental 
risks before the operation starts by using an environmental 
impact assessment, and subsequently requiring the permitting of 
polluters to include financial guarantees.278  In practice, some 
 
pure first-party insurance funded by victims, in a direct insurance policy the 
polluters pay for the premium.  The difference between direct insurance and 
liability insurance is that the trigger of coverage under direct insurance is the 
materialization of the insured risk rather than liability.  See FAURE & HARTLIEF, 
supra note 257, at 220-21. 
 272. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30. 
 273. Id. 
 274. This is doubtful, since even before the entry into force of the TLL, many 
specialized environmental laws contained strict liability.  See supra part II.A.b.  
However, it is probably not the lack of strict liability, but rather the low 
likelihood of being found liable by a court, which reduced the liability risk. 
 275. Interview with MEP Rep., supra note 121. 
 276. Id.; Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30; Interview with Prof. 
Wang Jin, supra note 89. 
 277. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89. 
 278. Id. 
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industries with high environmental risks are also required to 
seek insurance coverage in some local areas.279  However, some 
argue that charging a pollution fee from industry, which needs to 
be paid by permitted installations,280 and simultaneously 
requiring the purchase of insurance, makes polluters pay twice.  
It is suggested that part of the pollution fees paid by industry 
should be used to purchase environmental liability insurance.281  
Support for this proposition can be found in some local areas 
where the government has provided subsidies to pay 
environmental insurance premiums financed from the pollution 
fee charged from the enterprises.282  In other areas, the 
government links environmental insurance with other 
environmental subsidies and green credit policies.283 
 
 279. For example, in Wuxi (a city in Jiangsu Province), some enterprises have 
been obliged to buy environmental insurance since 2011, depending on its 
location and type.  See [Opinions on Implementation of Environmental Liability 
Insurance in Wuxi] (promulgated by the Gov’t Office of Wuxi, Feb. 22, 2011) 
[hereinafter Environmental Liability Insurance in Wuxi], available at 
http://www.wuxi.gov.cn/zfxxgk/szfxxgkml/zcfg/szfbgswj/5967445.shtml (China).  
A compulsory system was also adopted in Changsha and Guangxi.  See [Rules on 
the Management of Environmental Risk Enterprises] (promulgated by the 
Changsha Envtl. Prot. Agency, Aug. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Changsha Rules], 
available at http://www.changsha.gov.cn/xxgk/gfxwj/szfgzbm/shbj/201007/ 
t20100701_82840.html (China); [Opinions on the Implementation of 
Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance] (promulgated by the Guangxi 
Envtl. Prot. Bureau, Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://www.gxepb.gov.cn/ 
xxgkml/ztfl/hjglywxx/wrfz/201108/t20110823_6007.html (China). 
 280. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89. 
 281. Id. 
 282. In China, the polluters need to pay a pollution fee.  Sometimes it is 
argued that asking the polluters on the one hand to pay for a pollution fee, and 
on the other hand to buy the environmental insurance, in fact makes them pay 
twice.  Thus, in some local areas, parts of the pollution fees are used to provide a 
subsidy to the enterprises that buy environmental liability insurance.  Wuxi 
engages in this practice.  See Environmental Liability Insurance in Wuxi, supra 
note 279. 
 283. Sichuan is an example.  According to a Sichuan Environmental Protection 
Bureau document, the government, when deciding to offer subsidies on pollution 
control, should give priority to companies who bought environmental liability 
insurance.  The attendance of environmental liability insurance is also a 
criterion for examining green credit performance.   See [Opinion on the 
Implementation of the Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance Policy] 
(promulgated by the Sichuan Envtl. Prot. Agency, Nov. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.schj.gov.cn/cs/zcfg/jjzc/201212/t20121221_11217.html (China). 
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b. Environmental Insurance in Practice 
It is generally held that environmental insurance in China is 
underdeveloped, due to polluters’ low liability risks and non-
compulsory insurance options.284  The reasons for this have 
already been mentioned repeatedly: (1) polluters largely can 
count on the government to intervene in the restoration of 
polluted sites; (2) liability risks are low; and (3) with the 
exception of marine oil pollution—the purchase of insurance is 
not compulsory; thus, industry has little demand to purchase 
environmental insurance.285  Accordingly, an insurance market to 
provide products covering environmental risks has barely been 
developed in China.  In practice, a variety of insurance products 
that could cover environmental risks286 can indeed also be 
observed.  The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of 
these mechanisms.287 
First, the main insurance product covering environmental 
risks is the general liability insurance policy, which was extended 
to cover pollution risks three to four years ago.  However, 
pollution is not clearly defined in the policy, and the scope may be 
limited; there is usually a sublimit on the coverage for pollution 
damage, and moreover, the general liability insurance only covers 
accidents, and excludes gradual pollution.288 
Second, Chinese insurers also started offering stand-alone 
environmental liability insurance after 2007.  This type of 
insurance mainly covers personal injury and property damage 
caused by pollution, and does not cover specifically pure ecological 
damage.289  The cleanup costs—excluding cleanup at polluters’ 
own sites—can be covered either directly under this policy290 or 
 
 284. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89. 
 285. See supra part II.B.a. 
 286. See infra part III.A.b. 
 287. Interview with Ms. Zhang Jing and Ms. Jean Wu, Munich Reinsurance 
Company, in Beijing, China (Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with Beijing 
Branch of Munich Reinsurance Reps.] (on file with authors). 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. See CHINA CONTINENT PROP. & CASUALTY INS. CO., [ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLLUTION LIABILITY INSURANCE TERMS], available at http://www.iachina.cn: 
8080/iaclause/clause/html/20091207041357078.html (China). 
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via an added clause.291  However, usually cleanup costs are 
covered only to the extent that the cleanup may prevent further 
personal injury or property damage, and the cleanup costs to 
protect the environment itself are not covered.292  The restoration 
costs are usually also excluded.293 
The insurance policy uses claims-made clauses, which is 
customary in environmental liability coverage.  Under a claims-
made policy, the claim for damages has to be received by the 
insured or his insurer within the period of insurance coverage.294  
The policy may also require that the incident leading to the 
pollution have occurred within a certain retroactive period.295  
This increases the predictability to the insurers.  Some critics 
argue that claims-made policies could dilute the deterrent 
function of liability law.296  As far as premiums are concerned 
insurers make a distinction between companies that constitute 
high environmental risks and companies that do not.  For high-
risk companies, the insurer will usually appoint an expert to do a 
risk assessment, with which the to-be-insured company normally 
cooperates.297  For lower risk companies, the premium will be 
based on a fixed premium rating table.298  The compensation rate 
 
 291. See [CHINA PACIFIC PROPERTY INSURANCE CO., LTD.，ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITY INSURANCE, CLEAN UP COSTS CLAUSE [hereinafter CPIC CLEAN UP 
COSTS CLAUSE], available at https://www.cpic.com.cn/cx/upload/Attach/ 
infordisclosure/50867389.pdf (China). 
 292. Interview with Beijing Branch of Munich Reinsurance Reps., supra note 
287. 
 293. See CPIC CLEAN UP COSTS CLAUSE, supra note 291.  A distinction is made 
between cleanup costs and restoration costs.  The costs of measures to cleanup 
pollutants on insured sites are covered, while the costs of measures taken to 
restore the environment to its initial status are not. 
 294. See Martin Katzman, Pollution Liability Insurance and Catastrophic 
Environmental Risk, 55 J. RISK & INS. 75, 87 (1988) (explaining the claim-made 
policy). 
 295. See China Pacific Property Insurance Co., Ltd. [ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 
INSURANCE], art. 3, available at https://www.cpic.com.cn/cx/upload/Attach/ 
infordisclosure/50885015.pdf (China). 
 296. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Cost Internalization, Insurance, and Toxic Tort 
Compensation Funds, 2 VA. J. NAT. RES. L. 123, 131 (1982). 
 297. Interview with Beijing Branch of Munich Reinsurance Reps., supra note 
287. 
 298. Id. 
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is still low, but experts believe that it could increase in the 
future.299 
A third type of policy is the pollution-site liability insurance 
policy, a third-party insurance policy providing coverage for 
damage to third parties, as well as remediation costs for polluted 
sites.300  This type of policy is still quite rare in China, although 
some companies, such as Huatai Insurance Company, provide 
this insurance.301  An analysis of their policy conditions clarifies 
the policy’s structure. 
Two types of risk can be covered under Huatai Insurance 
Company’s policy: (1) new pollution; and (2) pre-existing 
pollution.  The covered risk is defined as loss that “the insured is 
legally liable to pay as a result of [c]laims, remediation costs, and 
associated legal defense expenses” arising out of a “pollution 
condition on, at, under or migrating from the covered 
location(s).”302  This loss should be claimed or first discovered 
during the policy period, and reported to the insurer during the 
policy period or extended reporting period.  The difference 
between new pollution and pre-existing pollution is that under 
the title of “new pollution,” the pollution conditions should first 
commence during the policy period; while under the title of “pre-
existing pollution,” the pollution conditions should be first 
commenced prior to the inception date of the policy period.303 
This provision uses the clause “the insured is legally liable to 
pay,” showing that it is formally still liability insurance.  The 
term “claim” is defined broadly to include “government action(s), 
suits or other actions alleging responsibility or liability on the 
part of the insured for bodily injury, property damage, or 
 
 299. Id. 
 300. See Robert M. Horkovich et al., Site Pollution Liability Insurance, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE RECOVERY 506 (David L. Guevara & 
Frank J. Deveau eds.) (2012); Interview with Beijing Branch of Munich 
Reinsurance Reps., supra note 287. 
 301. See HUATAI INSURANCE COMPANY OF CHINA, LIMITED PREMISES POLLUTION 
LIABILITY INSURANCE 4-14 (2008) [hereinafter HUATAI PREMISES INSURANCE], 
available at http://www.ehuataisz.com/uploadfile/200806/Premises% 
20Pollution%20Liability%20Insurance.pdf. 
 302. Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 303. HUATAI PREMISES INSURANCE, supra note 301, at 4-5. 
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remediation costs arising out of pollution conditions. . . .”304  In 
other words, this policy covers both traditional third-party 
liability and remediation costs on premises for which the insured 
are legally liable to pay.  Note that pure environmental damage is 
also covered under this policy.305  The term “property damage” is 
defined to include “natural resource damages,”306 which means 
“damages for injury to or damage sustained by or destruction or 
loss of fish[,] wildlife[,] biota[,] land[,] air[,] water[,] 
groundwater[,] drinking water supplies[,] and other similar 
resources belonging to[,] managed by[,] held in trust by[,] 
appertaining to[,] or otherwise controlled by any government or 
local government authority.”307  “Remediation costs” are defined 
as “reasonable expenses incurred to investigate, quantify, 
monitor, mitigate, abate, remove, dispose, treat, neutralize, or 
immobilize pollution conditions to the extent required by 
environmental law.”308  Thus, unlike the environmental liability 
policies, by definition the coverage under premise pollution 
liability insurance is much broader.  However, since the clause 
requires the costs to be what the insured is legally liable to pay, 
the extent to which the broad provision under this policy will lead 
to broad compensation will still depend on the liability provisions 
and their explanations. 
Huatai Insurance Company started to provide such a product 
in 2008.  However, three years after beginning to provide this 
type of insurance, it was reported that the progress was still slow, 
and the insured were mainly enterprises with foreign-related 
issues.309 
In addition to pollution-site liability insurance, there are 
some other similar products with less extensive coverage.  These 
products cover cleanup costs on polluters’ own premises as added 
clauses to environmental liability insurance policies.  The added 
 
 304. Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 305. Id. at 8. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 309. See Xie Liu, [How to Promote Environmental Liability Insurance?], CHINA 
INSURANCE NEWS NETWORK (June 8, 2011), http://www.sinoins.com/101288/ 
101475/59505.html (China). 
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clauses provided by ChangAn Insurance310 and Ping An 
Insurance311 are two examples of environmental third-party 
liability insurance policies, which use an added clause to provide 
coverage for cleanup costs on the insured’s land. 
1. Product Liability Insurance 
As discussed above, traditional product liability policies do 
not exclude pollution and hence, in theory, provide broad 
coverage.312  Of course the condition is that the environmental 
damage must be linked to a product for which the insured is 
liable.  In that case, distinct from a general liability insurance 
policy, gradual damage would be covered.  However, in practice 
there has so far been no case of a claim for environmental damage 
under product liability coverage.  This, therefore, remains a 
largely theoretical possibility.313 
2. Property Insurance 
There is also general property damage insurance.  This 
covers first-party damage to the insured’s site.  In principle, 
pollution risks are also covered by such a property all-risk policy, 
unless particular damage would be explicitly excluded.314  This 
could be the case if the property damage to the insured’s site is 
caused by gradual erosion or pollution (i.e., excluding sudden 
pollution events and pollution events considered unforeseeable by 
the insurer).315 
 
 310. See [Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance Terms for Workplace 
Cleanup Costs], CHANGAN LIABILITY INS. CORP., http://www.iachina.cn:8080/ 
iaclause/clause/html/20091207035605187.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2013) 
(China). 
 311. See PING AN POLLUTION LIABILITY INSURANCE, [CLEANUP COSTS OF ON-
PREMISES SITES], available at http://property.pingan.com/upload/ 
20100701094634255.pdf (China). 
 312. See supra part III.A. 
 313. Interview with Beijing Branch of Munich Reinsurance Reps., supra note 
287. 
 314. Interview with Beijing Branch of Munich Reinsurance Reps., supra note 
287. 
 315. Id. 
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This shows that there are quite a few possibilities to 
purchase environmental insurance on the market, either 
explicitly or implicitly, via general—liability or property—
insurance policies.  However, it also shows that the number of 
companies active in the environmental insurance market is 
limited.316  For instance, China started experimenting in some 
local areas to develop the environmental insurance market after 
2007.317  It is reported that the revenue from environmental 
liability insurance only accounted for 0.015% of the total liability 
insurance revenue in these experimental areas in 2009.318  In 
Shenzhen, one of the experimental areas, only eight enterprises 
bought such insurance products in 2009.319  Professor Wang Jin 
confirmed that only some larger insurance companies provided 
explicit coverage for environmental damage, whereby the type of 
coverage provided by the different companies is quite similar.320  
There would only be a few differences as far as exclusions of 
liability, scope of coverage or premiums are concerned.321 
c. Difficulties and Limits 
Experts, insurance, and reinsurance companies all mention 
particular difficulties with the provision of environmental 
insurance in China.322  This should not come as a surprise given 
the relatively small number of insurance companies offering 
those policies and the relatively small number of insured.  
Insurers and reinsurers mention adverse selection as an 
 
 316. See [THE PATHWAY AND REGIME FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITY INSURANCE IN CHINA] (2011) [hereinafter PATHWAY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITY INSURANCE], available at http://www.cdrf.org.cn/uploads/soft/PDF/ 
20120329/baogao99.pdf (China) (summarizing the companies that provide 
environmental liability insurance up until 2009). 
 317. Id. 
 318. Lijing Liang Jialin, [The Ministry of Environmental Protection Tries to 
Promote Compulsory Environmental Liability Insurance], SINA (July 9, 2012), 
http://green.sina.com.cn/2012-07-09/103024739500.shtml (China). 
 319. Id. 
 320. Interview with Professor Wang Jin, supra note 89. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Interview with Professor Wang Jin, supra note 89; Interview with Beijing 
Branch of Munich Reinsurance Reps., supra note 287. 
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important problem.323  Adverse selection is the phenomenon 
caused by information asymmetry.324  Limited information on the 
side of insurers makes insurance particularly attractive for high-
risk companies, which could eventually endanger the insurability 
of risks.325  In China, the problem could arise that mainly high-
risk companies are interested in purchasing environmental 
insurance.326  The insured on their side also report that the 
amount of coverage would be too low, because insurance coverage 
is often only provided for 1 to 2 million RMB, and only in 
exceptional cases for 10 to 300 million RMB ($1.61 million to 
$48.17 million).327  Those amounts may indeed be rather low by 
international standards.328  Moreover, not only are there 
complaints of low coverage, but premiums are also considered to 
be high.329  The premium would be around 6% to 8% of the 
insured amount.330  Compared to on average 0.3%, which in the 
case of traditional liability insurance would be considered quite 
high.331  Given the difficulty of predicting environmental risks, 
insurers would likely, as the literature predicts, ask for an 
additional risk premium to cope with their insurer ambiguity.332  
But these high premiums may not generate any willingness to 
pay on the side of firms.333 
 
 323. Interview with Beijing Branch of Munich Reinsurance Reps., supra note 
287. 
 324. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality, Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 490-91 (1970). 
 325. See generally Michael Faure, Is Risk Differentiation on European 
Insurance Markets in Danger?, 14 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 83 (2007); R. 
Guy Thomas, Some Novel Perspectives on Risk Classification, 32 GENEVA PAPERS 
RISK & INS. – ISSUES & PRAC. 105 (2007). 
 326. Interview with Beijing Branch of Munich Reinsurance Reps., supra note 
287. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30. 
 330. Interview with Professor Wang Jin, supra note 89. 
 331. Id. 
 332. See generally Howard Kunreuther et al., Insurer Ambiguity and Market 
Failure, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 71 (1993). 
 333. Interview with Professor Wang Jin, supra note 89. 
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C. Summary 
As far as the ability of environmental insurance to provide 
adequate compensation for environmental harm in China is 
concerned, the first and major problem is the lack of an adequate 
institutional and statutory background for creating a market for 
environmental insurance.  In this respect, we not only refer to the 
absence of an obligation to purchase liability insurance,334 but 
also to the fact that most pollution risks are covered by the 
government, and that the probability that polluters will face 
environmental liability is generally low.  This explains a low 
demand for environmental insurance. 
While on the one hand one may notice quite a few theoretical 
possibilities for environmental insurance coverage in China, on 
the other hand there are few insurance companies offering 
environmental insurance, and also few companies interested in 
purchasing it.  Moreover, those who are interested are probably 
the high-risk ones, thus creating a serious adverse selection 
problem.  Despite the fact that a few specific environmental 
liability policies have been developed to cover environmental 
risks, experts emphasize the possibility of using general liability 
insurance and product liability policies to cover environmental 
liability.  General liability insurance and product liability policies 
remain largely theoretical possibilities, since they are not usually 
used in practice.  General liability policies often exclude pollution 
coverage; environment-related claims are rare in practice under 
product liability policies.  However, as discussed supra, it is not 
always easy to differentiate environmental liability from other 
liability covered under general liability policies or product 
liability policies.  Hence, the expert holds that those policies 
should be developed to cover environmental liability in China as 
well.  The only positive element one can mention is that 
apparently the Chinese insurance and reinsurance markets have 
developed a variety of environmental products that in principle 
are able to cover environmental risks.  Premiums today are still 
relatively high, but increased possibilities of risk assessment may 
reduce uncertainties and hence premiums. The crucial issue is 
 
 334. With the exception of the case of marine environmental pollution to be 
discussed infra part IV. 
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that an institutional environment should be created in which a 
demand of environmental insurance can emerge.  In that case, 
China apparently has sufficient possibilities to offer the necessary 
insurance coverage. 
IV. COMPENSATION FOR VESSEL-INDUCED 
MARINE OIL POLLUTION 
As discussed earlier, marine oil pollution deserves a separate 
discussion since it is one of the few instances where the liability 
and compensation instruments for natural resources damage 
seems to be working adequately.  This may be explained by the 
fact that some international conventions that China has joined 
oblige Member States to introduce a financial security—like 
compulsory insurance—for sea-going vessels to cover the risks of 
marine pollution.335  Moreover, a long tradition of coverage via 
the so-called protection and indemnity clubs for ships, to cover 
environmental pollution risks, exists in the field of marine 
pollution.336  The discussion on marine oil pollution in China will 
follow the same structure as in the above sections.  The legal 
framework will be briefly presented, followed by the practice of 
compensation for oil pollution in China. 
 
 335. William Tetley, Uniformity of International Private Maritime Law—The 
Pros, Cons, and Alternatives to International Conventions—How to Adopt an 
International Convention, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 775, 829-53 (2000) (appendix B of 
international maritime conventions indicating whether China has signed on).  
See infra part IV.A.a. 
 336. See generally T.G. Coghlin, Protection & Indemnity Clubs, LLOYD’S MAR. 
& COM. L. Q. 403 (1984) (offering an introduction to protection and indemnity 
clubs). 
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A. Theory 
a. Scope of Compensable Damage and Quantification 
of Damage 
The MEPL is the basic law in the field of marine 
environmental protection and pollution prevention.337  Article 90 
of the MEPL stipulates liability for marine pollution: 
Whoever causes pollution damage to the marine environment 
shall remove the pollution and compensate the losses; in case of 
pollution damage to the marine environment resulting entirely 
from the intentional act or fault of a third party, that third 
[party] shall remove the pollution and be liable for the 
compensation.338 
In line with the EPL and the TLL, strict liability is 
established under the MEPL.  However, it does not further 
explain what constitutes “pollution damage.”  Because China is a 
Member State of the 1992 Protocol,339 which amended the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage of 1969 (CLC),340 the definition of “pollution damage” 
under the CLC also applies to China.  However, in practice, there 
are still debates on the applicable scope of the CLC.  As discussed 
in part IV.A.b, infra, the CLC applies to “any sea-going vessel and 
seaborne craft of any type whatsoever constructed or adapted for 
the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo. . . .”341  The term “oil” is 
defined as “any persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil such as crude 
 
 337. WANG HUI, CIVIL LIABILITY FOR MARINE OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: A 
COMPARATIVE AND ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL, US AND CHINESE 
COMPENSATION REGIME, 227-28 (2011). 
 338. MEPL, art. 90. 
 339. See generally Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, Nov. 27, 1992. I.M.O., Misc 36 
(1994), Cm 2657, RMC I, 7.51, II.7.51 [hereinafter CLC Protocol of 1992], 
available at http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/protocivilpol1992.html.  
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage is an 
international convention on oil pollution liability established under the auspice 
of the International Maritime Organization, amended in 1992. 
 340. See generally id. 
 341. Id., art. I, para. 1. 
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oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil. . . .”342  Thus, 
when the pollution involves other types of vessels or crafts, or the 
damage is caused by non-persistent oil, the domestic Chinese law 
applies.  However, even when damage is caused by a ship and by 
oil, which are in principle covered by the CLC, there are still 
debates on whether the CLC applies only to ships with “foreign 
related issues” or to all types of sea-going vessels and seaborne 
crafts.343  How to interpret “foreign-related issues” is also 
important in determining the application of the CLC.344 
Concerning domestic law, the 2011 Explanation issued by the 
Supreme People’s Court guides the judgment on vessel-induced 
oil pollution.345  This explanation applies to “vessel-induced oil 
pollution damage as involved in oil pollution incidents of vessels 
that cause oil pollution damage or pose dangers of oil pollution 
damage in the territory or any other territorial sea of the People’s 
Republic of China.”346  The term “oil pollution damage” is 
explained in a similar way to the CLC, which includes: 
(1) Costs of preventive measures to prevent or minimize vessel-
induced oil pollution damage, and further loss or damage 
caused by preventive measures; 
(2) Property damage caused outside the vessel carrying oil by the 
vessel-induced oil pollution incident, and loss of earnings 
caused therefrom; 
 
 342. Id., art. I, para. 5. 
 343. See generally James Hu & Yang Bo, Application of Law in Civil Liability 
for Oil Pollution Damage Caused by Coastal Vessels in China, in PREVENTION 
AND COMPENSATION OF MARINE POLLUTION DAMAGE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
EUROPE, CHINA AND THE U.S. 193, 193-205 (Michael Faure & James Hu eds., 
2006); Michael Faure & Wang Hui, Financial Caps for Oil Pollution Damage: 
China and the International Conventions, in PREVENTION AND COMPENSATION OF 
MARINE POLLUTION DAMAGE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE, CHINA AND THE 
U.S. 317, 329-30 (Michael G. Faure & James Hu eds., 2006). 
 344. For example, a foreign element may be: (1) one involved party is a 
foreigner; (2) the cause of the case happens abroad; or (3) the subject matter is 
located abroad.  See Hu & Yang, supra note 343, at 198-99. 
 345. See generally [Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the Trial of Cases of Disputes over Compensation for Vessel-Induced 
Oil Pollution Damage] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. of the Sup. People’s 
Ct., May 4, 2011, effective July 1, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Explanation], 
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8822& 
CGid=&EncodingName=big5 (China). 
 346. Id., art. 1. 
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(3) Loss of earnings caused by environmental damage resulting 
from oil pollution; and 
(4) Costs of reasonable measures which have been taken or are 
about to be taken to restore the contaminated 
environment.347 
Under this definition, two points are related to natural resources 
damage: (1) prevention costs; and (2) restoration costs.  To further 
clarify the scope of compensable pure environmental damage 
(ecological damage), the explanation stipulates that: 
If a vessel-induced oil pollution incident causes environmental 
damage, the compensation for environmental damage shall be 
limited to expenses [for reasonable] measures which have been 
taken or are about to be taken to restore the environment.  Such 
expenses include reasonable expenses on monitoring, assessment 
and research.348 
Similarly to the CLC, the Supreme People’s Court adopted a 
cautious attitude to explain restoration costs; only the 
“reasonable” measures that “have been taken or are about to be 
taken” are considered compensable.349 
When compensation for natural resources damage is 
concerned, an unavoidable question arises of how to quantify such 
damage.  As discussed earlier, there are general rules on 
assessing natural resources damage in China.  A non-binding 
recommendation on assessment methods is published, which 
gives guidance on quantification of five types of damage: (1) 
personal injury; (2) property damage; (3) emergency response 
costs; (4) investigation and assessment costs; and (5) restoration 
costs.350  When restoration is possible, the restoration costs refer 
to the actual costs that have taken place, while if restoration is 
impossible, the recommendation advises the assessment of the 
loss on the basis of a simulated restoration method, and/or other 
suggested methods of calculation.351  In other words, the 
 
 347. 2011 Explanation, supra note 345, art. 9. 
 348. Id., art. 17. 
 349. Id., art. 9, para. 4. 
 350. METHODS ON ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, supra note 92, § 3.2. 
 351. Id., § 4.5. 
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recommendation goes further than the 2011 Explanation.  The 
latter allows compensation for restoration costs only when 
restoration has been taken or is about to be taken.  However, 
under the recommendation, compensation is still possible, even if 
restoration is not possible.352  In the field of water pollution, there 
are two standards guiding the quantification of fishery losses: (1) 
the 1996 Rules on Calculating Fishery Losses Caused by Water 
Pollution Accidents;353 and (2) the 2008 Calculation Methods for 
Economic Losses Caused by Fishery Pollution Accidents.354  The 
1996 rules apply both to the calculation of direct economic losses 
suffered by individuals, and to natural fishery resources that are 
not owned by private parties.355  The 2008 standards further 
clarify the methods to assess natural fishery losses.356  These two 
documents together provide a practical guidance in assessing one 
type of natural resources damage—natural fishery losses.  As for 
other types of natural resources damage, the Technical 
Guidelines for Ecological Damage Assessment on Marine Oil 
Spills provide more detailed guidance.357  They allow 
compensation for direct marine ecological losses, restoration costs 
for the habitats and species, as well as for assessment costs.358  
However, this is not a legally binding compensation standard, but 
a sectoral standard, providing guidance on the assessment of 
marine pollution damage. 
As far as marine environmental liability is concerned, there 
are several other issues worth discussing here.  The above 
discussion has shown that strict liability is established.  The 
 
 352. METHODS ON ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, supra note 92, § 4.5. 
 353. Rules on Calculating Fishery Losses, supra note 228. 
 354. [Calculation Methods for Economic Losses Caused by Fishery Pollution 
Accidents] (promulgated by the General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine and Standardization Administration, effective June 
1, 2008, GB/T 21678-2008) [hereinafter 2008 Standard for Calculation Methods], 
available at http://www.zjoaf.gov.cn/attaches/2008/11/24/ 
www092008112400005.doc (China). 
 355. Rules on Calculating Fishery Losses, supra note 228. 
 356. See 2008 Standard for Calculation Methods, supra note 354. 
 357. [Technical Guidelines for Ecological Damage Assessment on Marine Oil 
Spills] (issued by the Oceanic Agency, Apr. 9, 2007, effective May 1, 2007), 
available at http://www.tsinfo.js.cn/inquiry/gbtdetails.aspx?A100=HY/T%20095-
2007 (China). 
 358. Id. § 8. 
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MEPL allows three types of defenses: (1) damage caused by war; 
(2) “irresistible natural calamities”; and (3) “negligence or other 
wrongful acts in the exercise of functions of competent 
departments responsible for the maintenance of beacons or other 
navigation aids.”359  The MEPL is silent on how to determine 
liability if damage is caused by multiple tortfeasors.  One new 
characteristic of the TLL of 2009 is that multiple tortfeasors are 
severally liable for the environmental damage they caused.360  In 
line with this provision, Article 3 of the 2011 Explanation also 
introduces several liability as the primary form of liability to deal 
with the multiple tortfeasor issue: 
When oil has escaped from two or more vessels, and pollution 
damage results therefrom, if the party who suffers the damage 
requests that the owners of all vessels involved undertake the 
liability for compensation, the owners of all vessels involved shall 
undertake their respective liability for compensation if the 
damage is reasonably separable according to the quantity of oil 
leaked, the harm caused by their oil and other relevant factors; if 
the damage is not reasonably separable, the owners of all vessels 
involved shall be jointly and severally liable, unless exonerated 
by law.361 
Both in the United States, as well as in the international 
regime, liability for oil pollution is capped (with the exception of 
offshore facilities and deep-water ports under the Oil Pollution 
Act (OPA), liability for removal costs is unlimited).362  In China, 
neither the TLL nor the MEPL establish a cap on liability.  The 
Commercial Maritime Code (CMC), by contrast, allows the liable 
party to limit its maritime liability.363  It is worth noting that the 
categories of claims that are subject to the CMC limit are much 
 
 359. MEPL, art. 92. 
 360. TLL, art. 67 (“Where the environmental pollution is caused by two or 
more polluters, the seriousness of liability of each polluter shall be determined 
according to the type of pollutant, volume of emission and other factors.”). 
 361. 2011 Explanation, supra note 345, art. 3. 
 362. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2012). 
 363. [Commercial Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 7, 1992, 
effective July 1, 1993), art. 207, para. 4 [hereinafter CMC] (China). 
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broader than the types of oil pollution under the MEPL.364  Since 
China is a Member State of the CLC, which established a 
separate limit for oil pollution liability, the limits set in the CMC 
do not apply to claims for oil pollution under the CLC.365  As 
discussed earlier, there are debates on the applicable scope of the 
CLC in both academia and in case law.366  This debate also 
puzzles the determination of the limit for oil pollution damage.  
To clarify this issue, the Regulation on the Prevention and Control 
of Vessel-Induced Marine Environment Pollution of 2009 
stipulates: 
With regard to the limitation of liability for pollution damage 
caused by vessels, the provisions of Maritime Code of the People’s 
Republic of China in respect of the limitation of liability for 
 
 364. The limit under Article 27 of the CMC is established for: 
 
(1) Claims in respect of loss of life or personal injury or loss of or 
damage to property including damage to [harbor] works, basins 
and waterways and aids to navigation occurring on board or in 
direct connection with the operation of the ship or with salvage 
operations, as well as consequential damages resulting 
therefrom; 
(2) Claims in respect of loss resulting from delay in delivery in the 
carriage of goods by sea or from delay in the arrival of 
passengers or their luggage; 
(3) Claims in respect of other loss resulting from infringement of 
rights other than contractual rights occurring in direct 
connection with the operation of the ship or salvage operations; 
(4) Claims of a person other than the person liable in respect of 
measures taken to avert or minimize loss for which the person 
liable may limit his liability in accordance with the provisions of 
this Chapter, and further loss caused by such measures. 
 
Whatever way these claims are lodged, they may be entitled to limitation of 
liability.  However, with respect to the remuneration set out in paragraph 4, for 
which the person liable pays as agreed upon in the contract, in relation to the 
obligation for payment, the person liable may not invoke the provisions on 
limitation of liability of this Article.  CMC, art. 207. 
 365. See id., art. 208, para. 2. 
 366. See supra text accompanying note 343.  But see Zhang Liying, 
Compensation for the Domestic Oil Pollution in China’s Coast: Which Law Shall 
Apply?, in MARITIME POLLUTION LIABILITY AND POLICY: CHINA, EUROPE AND THE 
US 359, 359-69 (Michael G. Faure et al., eds., 2010) (discussing an alternative 
interpretation of the application scope of the CLC in case law). 
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maritime claims shall apply.  However, with regard to the 
limitation of liability for pollution damage caused by vessels 
carrying persistent oil in bulk to sea areas under the jurisdiction 
of the People’s Republic of China, the provisions of the 
international treaties concluded or acceded to by the People’s 
Republic of China shall apply. 367 
According to this provision, the CLC will apply as long as vessels 
carrying persistent oil cause the damage.  It seems that the 
“foreign-related issue” is no longer necessary for the application 
of the CLC.  If the damage is caused by an accident that does not 
fall under the scope of the CLC, such as damage caused by non-
persistent fuel oil or fuel oil carried by vessels rather than by 
tankers, then the limits under the CMC will apply.  This concept 
is also confirmed in the 2011 Explanation.368  In addition, the 
2011 Explanation clarifies that the costs of preventive measures 
are not subject to the CMC limitation if the damage is caused by 
non-persistent fuel oil or fuel oil carried by vessels rather than oil 
tankers.369 
b. Standing 
To make a claim for natural resources damage, a major 
obstacle in the Chinese legal system relates to the question of 
who has the locus standi. According to the CPL, only the party 
who has “a direct interest in the case” can bring a lawsuit to the 
court.370  However, when there is only damage to natural 
resources, especially public natural resources, that are not 
privately owned, it remains difficult to determine who has the 
standing to make a claim for the damage.  This obstacle has 
 
 367. [Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and 
Control of Vessel-Induced Marine Environment Pollution] (promulgated by the 
Executive Meeting of the State Council on Sept. 2, 2009, effective Mar. 1, 2010), 
art. 52 [hereinafter Regulation on Vessel-Induced Pollution], available at http:// 
dinrac.nowpap.org/documents/law/China/Regulations_on_Prevention_Control_of
_Vessel-induced_Marine_Environment_Pollution_ China.pdf (China). 
 368. 2011 explanation, supra note 345, art. 19. 
 369. Id. art. 20. 
 370. See supra part II.A.e. 
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excluded much public interest litigation in China.371  However, 
this is less of a problem for marine pollution.  The MEPL 
authorizes public authorities explicitly to bring claims for marine 
pollution damage: 
For damages to marine ecosystems, marine fishery resources and 
marine protected areas which cause heavy losses to the State, the 
department invested with power by the provisions of this law to 
conduct marine environment supervision and administration 
shall, on behalf of the State, put forward compensation demand 
to those held responsible for the damages.372 
In China, many natural resources are owned by the State.373  
This provision limits the competent public authorities who can 
 
 371. The claims for pollution of Songhua Jiang by PetroChina in 2005 provide 
an example.  See supra part II.B.c. 
 372. MEPL, art. 90. 
 373. Many natural resources in China are owned by the State or by the 
citizens collectively.  Article 81 of the GPCL states: 
 
State-owned forests, mountains, grasslands, unreclaimed land, 
beaches, water surfaces and other natural resources may be used 
according to law by units under ownership by the whole people; or 
they may also be lawfully assigned for use by units under collective 
ownership.  The State shall protect the usufruct of those resources, 
and the usufructuary shall be obliged to manage, protect and 
properly use them. 
 
State-owned mineral resources may be mined according to law by 
units under ownership by the whole people and units under 
collective ownership; citizens may also lawfully mine such resources.  
The State shall protect lawful mining rights. 
 
The right of citizens and collectives to lawfully contract for the 
management of forests, mountains, grasslands, unreclaimed land, 
beaches and water surfaces that are owned by collectives or owned 
by the State but used by collectives shall be protected by law.  The 
rights and obligations of the two contracting parties shall be 
stipulated in the contract in accordance with the law. 
 
State-owned mineral resources and waters as well as forest land, 
mountains, grasslands, unreclaimed land and beaches owned by the 
State and those that are lawfully owned by collectives may not be 
sold, leased, mortgaged or illegally transferred by any other means. 
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make claims for compensation to “the department invested with 
power by the provisions of this law to conduct marine 
environment supervision and administration . . . .”374  According 
to the MEPL, there are four types of public authorities involved: 
(1) environmental protection agencies; (2) ocean agencies; (3) 
maritime safety agencies; and (4) fishery administrations.375  The 
environmental protection agencies are responsible for protecting 
the ocean from land-based pollutants and coastal construction 
projects; ocean agencies are responsible for the supervision and 
administration of the marine environment, for preventing 
pollution caused by marine construction projects and dumping of 
wastes in the sea; maritime safety agencies are in charge of 
marine environmental protection in the port waters, and the 
investigation and handling of pollution accidents; the fishery 
administrations are responsible for pollution inside the fishing 
port waters, and protecting the ecological environment in fishing 
zones.376  The latter three parties play a major role in bringing 
suit for marine natural resources damage claims.  When a vessel 
accident leads to marine pollution, the Maritime Safety Agency 
(MSA) “shall have the right to adopt forcible measures to avoid or 
reduce pollution damage,”377 and is responsible for prevention 
measures and cleanup in case of an accident, and can claim such 
costs in court.  In addition to such measures, if the accident leads 
to other environmental losses, such as lost ecological capacity, the 
ocean agency can bring a claim for the damage.  The fishery 
administration can bring claims for lost natural fishery resources. 
c. Mandatory Financial Security 
As previously discussed, China is a Member State of the 
CLC, which introduces an obligation for shipowners to seek 
insurance coverage for the potential liability under the 
convention.378  Influenced by the CLC, the 1999 revisions to the 
MEPL require the establishment of vessel-induced oil pollution 
 
 374. MEPL, art. 90. 
 375. Id., art. 5. 
 376. MEPL, art. 5. 
 377. Id., art. 71. 
 378. See supra part IV.A.a. 
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liability insurance for vessels, the creation of an oil pollution 
compensation fund, and authorize the State Council to 
promulgate concrete rules on those issues.379  However, such 
concrete rules were only issued in 2009, through the Regulation 
on Vessel-Induced Pollution.380  The regulation obliges vessels 
navigating in the Chinese sea area—with the exception of vessels 
of less than 1,000 tons by gross tonnage carrying cargoes other 
than oil—to buy insurance or seek other financial security 
coverage.381  The amount of financial security they seek may be 
no less than the amount required under the CMC, and to which 
other conventions China accedes.382  An additional document was 
published in 2010 to further clarify and implement the types of 
vessels subject to the compulsory financial security 
requirement.383  The Implementation Rules also prescribe the 
amount of mandatory coverage as follows: 
 
Vessels with Persistent Oil 
Cargo 
Vessels with Non-Persistent Oil 
Cargo and Non-Oil Tankers 
Larger than 1,000 tons by gross 
tonnage 
Types of 
Vessels 
(gross 
tonnage) 
Amount of 
Financial 
Security 
 
Types of 
Vessels (gross 
tonnage) 
Amount of 
Financial 
Security 
 
(1) Less 
than 5,000 
tons 
4.51 million 
SDR384 
(1) 20 to 21 tons 
(excluding 21) 
27,500 SDR 
(2) 21 to 300 
tons 
(excluding 300) 
(1) + 500 
SDR/ton 
 
(2) More (1) + 631 (3) 300 to 500 167,000 SDR 
 
 379. MEPL, art. 66. 
 380. See generally Regulation on Vessel-Induced Pollution, supra note 367. 
 381. Regulation on Vessel-Induced Pollution, supra note 367, art. 53. 
 382. Id. 
 383. See generally [Implementation Rules on Civil Liability Insurance for 
Vessel-Induced Oil Pollution Damage] (promulgated by the Ministry of Transp. 
on Aug. 19, 2010, effective Oct. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Implementation Rules], 
available at faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/chn106766E.doc (China). 
 384. Special Drawing Right (SDR). 
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than 5,000 
tons 
SDR/ton; 
but the 
maximum 
amount is 
89.77 
million SDR 
tons  
(4) 501 to 
30,000 tons 
(3) + 167 
SDR/ton 
(5) 30,001 to 
70,000 tons 
(4) + 125 
SDR/ton 
(6) More than 
70,001 tons 
(5) + 83 
SDR/ton 
Table 1: Types of vessels and required financial security.385 
 
The Implementation Rules require Chinese vessels either to buy 
insurance from the insurers determined by the MSA or to acquire 
other financial security, such as a letter of guarantee and letter of 
credit from insurers or other financial institutions determined by 
the MSA.386  The requirements for determining the qualifications 
of Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs and commercial 
insurance companies are also clarified in the Implementation 
Rules.387  In 2012, twenty-three insurance companies and P&I 
Clubs were acknowledged by the MSA, including the China 
Shipowners Mutual Assurance Association (CSMAA), commercial 
insurers, and members of the International Group of Protection & 
Indemnity Clubs (IG Group).388 
d. Compensation Funds 
Though China acceded to the CLC in 1980, it is not a 
Member State of the International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage (International Oil Pollution Compensation 
 
 385. Implementation Rules, supra note 383, art. 5, 6. 
 386. Implementation Rules, supra note 383, art. 8. 
 387. Id., art. 9, 10. 
 388. [Notice on the Lists of Insurance Companies Providing Oil Pollution 
Damage Liability Insurance for Chinese Vessels of 2012] (issued by the China 
Maritime Safety Admin., Dec. 19, 2011), available at http://www.tjmsa.gov. 
cn/_data/2012/03/30/6d283d52_f876_4215_8c66_60eff2aa6ca9/ (China).  The 
International Group of P&I Clubs (IG Group) is composed of thirteen principle 
P&I Clubs, which provide liability coverage for appro imately 90% of the world’s 
ocean-going tonnage.  INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF P&I CLUBS, http://www.igpandi. 
org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2014). 
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Fund or IOPCF) of 1971 and 1992.389  Therefore it is not 
obligatory for the Chinese oil industry to contribute to the Oil 
Pollution Fund.390  However, the Regulation on Vessel-Induced 
Pollution requires the establishment of a domestic Vessel-induced 
Oil Pollution Damage Compensation Fund (Compensation 
Fund).391  According to the regulation, all “the cargo owners or 
their agents who receive persistent oil cargo carried by sea within 
sea areas [of China]” shall contribute to the Compensation 
Fund.392  The concrete rule to manage the fund was recently 
published.393 
The Regulation on the Compensation Fund sets the 
contribution at 0.3 RMB per ton of persistent oil.394  The fund can 
be used to compensate or indemnify when: (1) the total amount of 
compensation exceeds the shipowner’s limitation of liability; (2) 
the legal defenses are available; (3) the shipowner and its 
insurer/guarantor cannot provide full compensation; and (4) the 
liable ships cannot be identified.395  Three exceptions are clarified 
for when the Compensation Fund does not apply: (1) damage 
caused by war, insurrections, or non-commercial vessels/military 
ships held by the government; (2) claimants who cannot prove 
that the oil pollution is caused by ships; or (3) damage that is 
 
 389. See I.M.O., STATUS OF MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS IN 
RESPECT OF WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION OR ITS 
SECRETARY-GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITARY OR OTHER FUNCTIONS, 242, 274-81, 
288-95 (2014), available at http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ 
StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20%202014%20New%20Version.pdf. 
 390. According to Article 10 of the IOPCF, the contracting states must ensure 
annual contributions to the Fund.  I.O.P.C.F., LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR 
OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: TEXTS OF THE 1992 CIVIL LIABILITY CONVENTION, THE 
1992 FUND CONVENTION AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY FUND PROTOCOL 26 (2011 ed.) 
available at http://www.iopcfunds.org/uploads/tx_iopcpublications/Text_of_ 
Conventions_e.pdf.  China is not a party to this Convention; hence such 
obligation does not exist. 
 391. Regulation on Vessel-Induced Pollution, supra note 367, art. 56. 
 392. Id. 
 393. [Management Regulation of Collection and Use of the Vessel-Induced 
Pollution Damage Compensation Fund] (promulgated by the Ministry of Fin. & 
the Ministry of Transp., May 11, 2012, effective July 1, 2012) [hereinafter 
Regulation on Compensation Fund], available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-
05/28/content_2147033.htm (China). 
 394. Id., art. 6. 
 395. Id., art. 15. 
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fully or partially caused by the victims’ own fault.396  One major 
difference between the Compensation Fund and the IOPCF is 
that the former establishes a priority list to provide compensation 
in case of insufficient capacity of the fund.  For the claims caused 
by different accidents, the Compensation Fund shall deal with 
the compensation according to the time of application.  If the 
claims are caused by the same accident, then the compensation 
shall be provided according to the following order: (1) emergency 
response costs; (2) cleanup costs; (3) direct economic losses 
suffered by the fishery and the tourism industry; (4) the costs of 
measures to restore the marine ecosystem and natural fishery 
resources; (5) monitoring costs incurred by the management 
committee of the Compensation Funds; and (6) other costs 
approved by the State Council.397  The upper limit of 
compensation for one accident is set at 30 million RMB.398 
B. Practice 
a. Claims Filing 
Administrative agencies, especially the MSA, have an 
important role in filing and handling claims.  The MSA is in 
charge of the response and cleanup of pollution from accidents.399   
The State Oceanic Agency (SOA) is responsible for the restoration 
of the environment.400  Most claims for ecological damage are 
brought either by the MSA or by the SOA.  Fishermen are usually 
the victims who bring claims for individual losses.  Most disputes 
are settled before they can be brought to court.401 
Different authorities have the competence for claiming 
compensation in the case of marine oil pollution, and the division 
of power between local authorities and the central government is 
 
 396. Id., art. 16. 
 397. Regulation on Compensation Fund, supra note 393, art. 17. 
 398. Id., art. 18. 
 399. Interview with Representatives of China Shipowners Mutual Assurance 
Association, in Beijing, China (Aug. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with 
CSMAA Reps.] (on file with authors). 
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. 
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not always clear.402  Usually, in maritime environmental 
litigation, the SOA brings claims for pure environmental damage, 
whereas the MSA brings claims for cleanup costs and imposes 
fines.403  Compensation for damage caused by the ship, Tasman 
Sea, is an example of a case brought by the oceanic and fishery 
agencies.  This case was reported as the first case in China where 
natural resource damage was compensated.404  In 2003, Tasman 
Sea collided near Tianjin and leaked oil causing serious damage 
to the fishing industry and the marine environment.405  The 
Tianjin Oceanic Agency brought claims against the ship for the 
loss of oceanic environmental capacity, loss of marine 
biodiversity, restoration costs, and assessment costs, while the 
Fishery Agency brought claims for natural fishery losses.406  In 
the first judgment in 2004, the defendants were held to pay the 
Oceanic Agency for the loss of environmental capacity and 
assessment costs of more than 10 million RMB, and the 
defendants had to pay the Fishery Agency more than 15 million 
RMB for natural fishery losses.407  However, the division of 
authority is not always clear.  Sometimes the prosecutors, 
environmental agencies, or local governments also bring claims 
for ecological damage.408 
 
 402. See Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89. 
 403. Interview with CSMAA Reps., supra note 399. 
 404. See Ma Jing-jing & Du Jiang, Discussion on the National Claim System 
for Oil Pollution Damage from Ships, in PREVENTION AND COMPENSATION OF 
MARINE POLLUTION DAMAGE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE, CHINA AND THE 
US 223, 224, 231 (Michael G. Faure & James Hu eds., 2006); see also ZHU XIAO, 
[A STUDY OF SOCIALIZED INDEMNIFICATION FOR ECOLOGICAL DAMAGE: A 
JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE] 28-30 (2007). 
 405. Xiaoqin Zhu & Lin Dong, Legal Remedies for Marine Ecological Damage 
in China: As Illustrated by the Tasman Sea Oil Spills Case, 2 J.E. Asia & Int’l L. 
391, 394-95 (2009) (noting that this case has been appealed by the defendant to 
the High Court of Tianjin, and the final judgment has not been made public). 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. 
 408. See infra part IV.B.d. 
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b. Compensation Through P&I Clubs 
Only certified insurers and P&I Clubs can provide insurance 
coverage for oil pollution in China.409  CSMAA is one of the 
largest insurance providers for oil pollution liability in China.  A 
P&I Club is composed of shipowners who enter into a risk-
sharing agreement that mutually covers each other’s losses.410  
CSMAA and other P&I Clubs formally function as a risk-sharing 
agreement, and not as an insurer, because risks are mutually 
shared and not shifted to a third party.411  However, from the 
victim’s perspective, the crucial point is that P&I Clubs 
compensate the losses for which the members—usually 
shipowners—are covered.412  It is worth noting that CSMAA is 
not a member of the IG Group. 
Clause 12 of the Rules of CSMAA cover pollution risks. 
According to this clause, the following risks are included: 
A. Liability for loss, damage or contamination. 
B. Any loss, damage or expense which the Member incurs, or for 
which he is liable, as a party to any agreement approved by 
the Directors, including the costs and expenses incurred by 
the Member in performing his obligations under such 
agreements. 
C. The costs of any measures reasonably taken for the purpose of 
avoiding or minimizing pollution or any resulting loss or 
damage together with any liability for loss of or damage to 
property caused by measures so taken. 
D. The costs of any measures reasonabl[y] taken to prevent an 
imminent danger of the discharge or escape from the entered 
ship of oil or any substance which may cause pollution. 
E. The costs of liabilities incurred as a result of compliance with 
any order or direction given by any government or authority, 
 
 409. See supra part IV.A.c. 
 410. See T.G. Coghlin, Protection & Indemnity Clubs, LLOYD’S MAR. COMM. 
L.Q. 404 (1984). 
 411. See FAURE & HARTLIEF, supra note 257, at 167-68 (discussing the 
differences between risk sharing and insurance). 
 412. One important line of CSMAA’s policies is the liability insurance, which 
covers damage to cargo, personal injury, and pollution damage.  See Profile, 
CHINA SHIPOWNERS MUTUAL ASSURANCE ASSOCIATION, http://www.cpiweb.org/ 
xiehuijigou/en_aboutus.jsp (Jan. 11, 201 ) (discussing CSMAA’s member 
coverage). 
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for the purpose of preventing or reducing pollution or the risk 
of pollution, provided always that: 
a. such compliance is not a requirement for the normal 
operation or salvage or repair of the entered ship; and 
b. such costs or liabilities are not recoverable under the Hull 
Policies or the Hull Certificates of the entered ship.413 
The rules of P&I Clubs usually do not contain a specific title 
concerning restoration costs, because these are covered under the 
title of cleanup costs. Cleanup costs need to be reasonable and 
real.  According to CSMAA, interim losses are difficult to be 
evaluated, and are usually not compensated.414 
CSMAA has an acceptance policy where a ship is inspected 
before it will be covered.415  A classification society is designated 
to undertake the inspection.416  When CSMAA believes that the 
ship is not qualified, it can either ask for the improvement of 
safety measures or refuse to cover the ship.417  Because insurance 
coverage is mandatory, if the ship is refused coverage, the 
shipowner will have to seek coverage from another P&I Club or 
insurer.418  After the ship has been accepted, insurers perform 
random inspections based on the presumed quality properties of 
the ship and its age.419  The premiums charged for sea-going 
ships and inland ships that remain in China do not vary 
considerably.420  These differences are usually based on technical 
differences between the ships and on the past loss experience.421  
The ship’s premium will be increased in the case of a heavy claim 
record.422  The evaluation of risks is based on the shipowner’s 
entire fleet, rather than on the basis of an individual ship.423  
 
 413. By-laws & Rules: Section 12, CHINA SHIPOWNERS MUTUAL ASSURANCE 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.cpiweb.org/en_baoxiantiaokuan/3.8.jsp (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2014). 
 414. Interview with CSMAA Reps., supra note 399. 
 415. Interview with CSMAA Reps., supra note 399. 
 416. Id. 
 417. Id. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. 
 420. Id. 
 421. Interview with CSMAA Reps., supra note 399. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Id. 
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Because CSMAA only provides coverage, reinsurance is 
purchased annually from the international group of P&I Clubs for 
any amount above the retention rate.424 
c. Remedies 
In marine pollution cases, compensation is usually claimed 
for the loss of fishery resources, with distinctions made between 
the direct losses, involving the fish that immediately died as a 
result of the pollution, middle losses, and long-term losses.425  
Cleanup costs from removing oil are also claimed, and these 
cleanup costs and losses by cleanup measures can usually be 
easily calculated, because these costs are known.426  These costs 
are easier to reclaim, because public authorities can use an arrest 
of a vessel to cover the costs of cleanup and preventive 
measures.427  Difficulties often arise concerning the acceptability 
of the government’s proposed or executed restoration measures 
concerning the evaluation of the damage.428 
A regime of vessel pollution cleanup agreements is 
established to ensure the timely cleanup of pollution.  Some types 
of vessels are required to sign cleanup agreements with qualified 
institutions before they arrive at Chinese harbors.429  If the 
vessels have an accident, these agreements require a vessel 
pollution cleanup institution to provide response and cleanup 
 
 424. See generally Michael Faure & Roger Van Den Bergh, Competition on the 
European Market for Liability Insurance and Efficient Accident Law, 9 
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 279 (2002) (discussing the function of the 
international group of P&I Clubs). 
 425. Rules on Calculating Fishery Losses, supra note 228 (distinguishing 
between direct economic losses and natural fishery losses, which are usually 
called direct losses, and middle and long-term losses in practice). 
 426. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89. 
 427. See [Maritime Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 2 , 1999, 
effective July 1, 2000), art. 21 (China). 
 428. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89. 
 429. See [Marine Pollution from Ships Environmental Emergency 
Preparedness and Emergency Management Regulations (Draft)] (issued by the 
Ministry of Transp., Sept. 13, 2010), art. 29-30, available at http://www.mot.gov. 
cn/zizhan/siju/tifasi/lifaguanli/lifajihua/201009/t20100913_807321.html (China). 
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services.430  Such cleanup institutions have to be certified by the 
MSA.431 
China’s experience with marine ecological damage claims is 
growing.432  Sometimes public authorities will bring claims for 
this damage.433  However, on the national level, regulation on 
using the damages claimed from the polluters is lacking.  
Recently, some local areas have started to publish regulations on 
this issue, such as Guangdong Province’s Temporary Regulatory 
Document on the Use of Money Compensated for the Oceanic and 
Fishery Environment.434  The document applies to the 
compensation awarded to oceanic and fisheries agencies for the 
marine environmental damage and fishery losses in the 
Guangdong Province.435  It held that the money should be put in 
a specific financial account of the provincial or local treasury, and 
should be used to compensate, monitor, and protect the marine 
fishery resources, and to eventually remediate the marine 
environment.436 
d. Cases 
In recent years, there has been an increase in cases involving 
claims for marine (inland waters) ecological damage in China.437  
This article uses sixty-six marine environmental pollution cases 
adjudicated by the Guangzhou Maritime Court from 1991 to 2009 
as an example to show how ecological damage can be 
 
 430. Id., art. 33. 
 431. Id., art. 27. 
 432. See supra part IV.B.a. 
 433. Id. 
 434. [Guangdong Temporary Regulatory Document on the Use of Money 
Compensated for the Oceanic and Fishery Environment] (promulgated by the 
Guangdong Dep’t of Fin., effective Oct. 2 , 2006), [hereinafter Guangdong 
Temporary Regulatory Document] available at http://3y.uu456.com/bp-
daaf3bc3sfbfc77da269b143-1.html (China). 
 435. Guangdong Temporary Regulatory Document, supra note 434, art. 2. 
 436. Id., art. 3-4. 
 437. See Li Zhiping et. al., [Water Pollution Public Interest Litigation in 
Practice: Research Report on Relevant Cases in Guangzhou Maritime Court 
(1991-2009)], 9 (1) U. SUN YAT-SEN L. REV. 239, 240-41 (2011) (China). 
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compensated in China.438  In many of those cases, fishery 
associations or local communities brought claims for their fishery 
losses.439  There are also fourteen public interest litigation cases 
where compensation was awarded for ecological damage.440  
There are generally two types of plaintiffs in these cases: (1) 
public authorities; and (2) procuratorates.  Maritime safety 
agencies and oceanic and fishery agencies are the most common 
plaintiffs in the category of public authorities.441  Eight cases 
involve oceanic and fishery agencies as plaintiffs and two cases 
involve maritime safety agencies.442  Other authorities have also 
been involved in cases, such as: (1) the environmental protection 
bureaus (one case); (2) the environmental and health 
management departments (one case); and (3) local government 
(one case).443  Those cases show how judges deal with standing 
issues for public interest litigation in the marine pollution area in 
China.444  However, the actual number of pollution cases may be 
substantially higher, because many cases are settled before being 
 
 438. This information is based on the Project, “Water Pollution Public Interest 
Litigation” held jointly by Sun Yat-sen University Faculty of Law and the 
Guangzhou Maritime Court.  We are grateful to Professor Li Zhiping of Sun Yat-
sen University and to Ms. Yang of the Guangzhou Maritime Court for providing 
the helpful information.  It is worth noting that not all the tort cases adjudicated 
in the Maritime Court are related to vessels.  See Interview with Ms. Yang, 
Judge, Guangzhou Maritime Court, in Guangzhou, China (Aug. 12, 2011) (on 
file with authors).  According to a Supreme People’s Court judicial e planation, 
the Maritime Court accepted not only cases concerning damage and pollution 
caused by vessels, but also “[c]ases on disputes over claims for damages arising 
out of shipping, production, operations on the sea or on water areas leading to 
the sea. . . .”  [Some Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Scope of 
Cases to be Entertained by Maritime Courts] (promulgated by Judicial 
Committee of the Sup. People’s Ct., Aug. 9, 2001) art. 1, para.  , available at 
http://www.gzhsfy.org/english/shownews.php?id=9772 (China).  In addition to 
vessel-related tort cases, the Guangzhou Maritime Court also accepts “cases on 
disputes over claims for damage arising out of pollution on the sea or water 
areas leading to the sea.”  Id. at app. 3. 
 439. Li et. al., supra note 437, at 240-41. 
 440. Id. 
 441. Li et. al., supra note 437, at 240-41. 
 442. Id. 
 443. Id. 
 444. Id. 
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tried in court.445  Moreover, this sample only relates to the 
Guangzhou Maritime Court located in the South of China.446 
In the examined cases, compensation is awarded for different 
types of pollution.  The fishery associations and local 
communities are awarded damages that are calculated based on 
the fishery losses they collectively suffered.  The other cases deal 
with public interest litigation where public authorities and 
procuratorates bring claims for cleanup costs, natural fishery 
losses, assessment costs, and at times, restoration costs.447  
Several cases involved compensation for environmental damage 
in addition to compensation for the above mentioned types of 
losses.  Guangzhou Haizhu District Procuratorate v. 
Chenzhongming448 and Guangzhou Panyu District Procuratorate 
v. Lu Pingzhang449 are two cases that involve claims for cleanup 
costs and fishery losses, as well as ecological damage; however, 
these two cases do not involve vessel-induced pollution.  In both 
cases, the defendants’ enterprise caused the water pollution, and 
the environmental damage was assessed broadly based on the 
assessment report.450  In Guangzhou Haizhu District 
Procuratorate, direct economic losses were assessed, which 
 
 445. Interview with CSMAA Reps., supra note 399; Interview with 
Representative of the Oceanic and Fisheries Administration of Guangdong 
Province, in Guangzhou, China (Aug. 15, 2011) (on file with authors). 
 446. Id. 
 447. For example, in the case of the Zhuhai Environmental Protection Bureau 
v. Taizhou Donghai Marine Transport Limited and China Vessels Fuel 
Supplying Fujian Company (Fujian Company), one of the defendant’s vessels 
had an accident leading to an oil spill and marine pollution in Zhuhai.  The 
Environmental Protection Bureau adopted both cleanup and restoration 
measures, and it filed claims for both costs and assessment costs in the court.  
In the judgment, Fujian Company was ordered to pay for all those costs.  
[Zhuhai Envtl. Prot. Bureau v. Taizhou Donghai Marine Transp. Ltd. & China 
Vessels Fuel Supplying Fujian Co.], Guanghaifashizi no. 88 (Guangzhou Mar. 
Ct. 1999) (China) (on file with Guangzhou Maritime Court). 
 448. [Guangzhou Haizhu Dist. Procuratorate v. Chenzhongming], 
Guanghaifachuzi no. 382 (Guangzhou Mar. Ct. 2008) [hereinafter Guangzhou 
Haizhu District Procuratorate] (China) (on file with Guangzhou Maritime 
Court). 
 449. [Guangzhou Panyu Dist. Procuratorate v. Lu Pingzhang], 
Guanghaifachuzi no. 247 (Guangzhou Mar. Ct. July 22, 2009) [hereinafter 
Guangzhou Panyu District Procuratorate], available at http://www.gzhsfy.org/ 
showjudgement.php?id=4367 (China). 
 450. Id.; Guangzhou Haizhu District Procuratorate, supra note 448. 
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included monitoring costs, water resources fees, and cleanup 
costs.451  In addition, indirect economic losses resulting from the 
environmental damage were assessed.452  However, the court 
held that these were too difficult to evaluate and could not be 
compensated.453  The same issue arose for water treatment costs, 
as they were considered too difficult to evaluate, and also were 
not compensated.454  In Guangzhou Panyu District Procuratorate, 
three kinds of losses were included under “environmental 
damage.”  These losses were: (1) direct damage (damage to 
agriculture, fisheries, and ecology); (2) indirect damage (economic 
losses of other productive and consumptive systems that were 
caused by water pollution, and costs of preventive measures); and 
(3) loss of enjoyment; however, compensation was only granted 
for direct and indirect damage.455 
The representatives from CSMAA held that oil pollution is an 
important risk and leads to quite a few cases involving the 
discharge of bulk and cargo oil.456  So far China has not suffered 
from major vessel-induced pollution incidents of the magnitude of 
Erika or Prestige.457  Since then, there have been many smaller 
cases, none of which have exceeded the limit of the insurance 
coverage.458 
e. Challenges 
Although the evaluation and compensation of marine 
pollution damage is better than the evaluation and compensation 
in land-based pollution cases, there are still problems in this 
domain as well.  Most of these problems relate to the evaluation 
of environmental damage.  The two cases examined above that 
were heard in the Guangzhou Maritime Court, also show the 
practical difficulties involved, as experts are unable to evaluate 
 
 451. Guangzhou Haizhu District Procuratorate, supra note 448. 
 452. Id. 
 453. Id. 
 454. Id. 
 455. See Guangzhou Panyu District Procuratorate, supra note 449. 
 456. Interview with CSMAA Reps., supra note 399. 
 457. See Emma Daly, After Oil Spill, Spain and France Impose Strict Tanker 
Inspections, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2002, A5. 
 458. Interview with CSMAA Reps., supra note 399. 
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the indirect economic losses or loss of enjoyment, and therefore, 
these losses are neglected.  These difficulties arise because there 
is no standard for evaluating marine environmental damage, and 
there is no consistent method for evaluating the damage.459  The 
absence of evaluation methods leads to uncertainty, and the 
potential for undercompensation.460 
V. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Environmental damage is compensated in China by looking 
at the theoretical compensation possibilities based on the statutes 
and rules.  Given the limits of the empirical method used, one 
should be careful with drawing strong normative conclusions 
based on this analysis.  We realize that although some interviews 
were conducted with representatives from government agencies, 
academia, NGOs, and insurers, the number of interviews was 
limited and most of them were concentrated in the Beijing and 
Guangzhou areas.  Moreover, we had no opportunity to talk to 
“real” victims of pollution.461  Recent publications that were based 
on interviews conducted with “real” victims demonstrate that 
there is still a lot of work to do.462  In this section, a short 
economic analysis of the compensation system, and policy 
recommendations for future development are discussed. 
A. Economic Analysis of the Chinese Compensation 
System for Environmental Damage 
a. Liability Rules 
Economic analysis shows that regulation and liability can be 
used together to create efficient preventive incentives for 
 
 459. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89. 
 460. CSMAA Representatives held the opposite, believing overcompensation 
may be the case.  See Interview with CSMAA Reps., supra note 399. 
 461. Although we interviewed Professor Wang Canfa, who works at the Centre 
for Legal Aid to Pollution Victims (CLAPV), and is knowledgeable about the 
problems victims of environmental pollution in China are facing, we have not 
interviewed pollution victims directly. 
 462. See, e.g., van Rooij, The Compensation Trap, supra note 148, at 740-41. 
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potential polluters.  Regulation, liability rules, information 
asymmetry between private parties and the regulatory authority 
about risky activities, insolvency, availability of legal action, and 
administrative costs are some factors that can deter people from 
bringing a suit.463  This is also true in China.  Although China 
has made improvements in establishing its environmental legal 
framework464 and strengthening enforcement,465 China is still 
subject to huge enforcement challenges, because it still suffers 
from weak agency capacity and capture-prone governance.466  In 
this case, liability rules can be used to fill the regulation and 
enforcement gaps. 
General civil laws and specific environmental statutes work 
together to create the legal basis for environmental liability.  The 
newly adopted TLL in China467 reiterated a few principles and 
clarified some issues concerning environmental liability.  A 
comparatively comprehensive and sound liability system for 
personal injury and property damage caused by the environment 
has been established on paper.  Liable parties are held strictly 
liable, which in theory can lead to efficient care and activity 
levels.  A reversal of the burden of proof can relieve the victims of 
the heavy burden to prove the causation between the pollution 
and their damage.  There is no provision channeling liability to 
specific parties, and there are no general caps on liability.468  
Although this seems in accord with economic theory,469 a review 
of practical experiences has shown that the possibilities formal 
legislation offers are insufficiently used.  As noted supra, only a 
small fraction of environmental disputes end up in court.  The 
 
 463. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 357, 359-64 (1984). 
 464. See Wang, supra note 111, at 202-03. 
 465. See Benjamin van Rooij, Implementation of Chinese Environmental Law: 
Regular Enforcement and Political Campaigns, 37 DEV. & CHANGE 57, 65-69 
(2006). 
 466. Lesley K. McAllister et al., Reorienting Regulation: Pollution Enforcement 
in Industrializing Countries, 32 L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2010). 
 467. See generally TLL. 
 468. No such provisions can be found in the TLL, GPCL or EPL. 
 469. See DETERRENCE, INSURABILITY AND COMPENSATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITY: FUTURE DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 181-85 (MICHAEL 
FAURE ed., 2003) (describing an economics analysis of environmental liability). 
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lack of environmental dispute litigation cannot be entirely 
explained by the legal culture that people are reluctant to go to 
court.  Rather, the explanation lies in the barriers in access to the 
courts that arise because the court is cautious to accept sensitive 
or collective cases, and to reject a case where a written verdict 
still exists, therefore leaving the victims’ rights unremedied.470  
Even when a case reaches the court, the theoretical reversal of 
the burden of proof is not always enforced in practice.471  Without 
clear assessment standards and support from local government, 
the victims are often haunted with the difficulties of proving their 
damages, the pollution action, and causal links.472 
Obstacles arise when trying to abate ecological damage, not 
only in practice, but also on paper.  First, Chinese law does not 
impose an obligation on specific parties—polluters or specific 
public authorities—to restore the damaged environment.  Second, 
with the exception of marine pollution, the law is also unclear on 
whether ecological damage is compensable.  Although general 
environmental liability provisions can be found in the new TLL, it 
does not explicitly reference pure ecological damage.  Moreover, 
hurdles are not only present in substantive law, but also arise in 
procedural law.  Ecological damage may be widespread, and may 
not involve individual victims.  Chinese law allows for very 
limited public interest litigation, which poses a serious challenge 
to the locus standi.  Lack of assessment standards also makes 
compensation for ecological damage difficult in practice. 
These legislative gaps have led to insufficient restoration and 
compensation.  For example, there is an important governmental 
role in the cleanup of polluted sites.  This could be viewed 
positively as the government taking responsibility for cleanup 
actions.  However, this causes numerous difficulties.  One 
problem is that actions are usually not directed against polluters.  
Since historically pollution is often caused by SOEs, the 
government’s incentive to act against polluters may be limited.  
Moreover, the government will often provide restoration itself, 
 
 470. See supra part II.B.c. 
 471. Stern, supra note 154, at 85. 
 472. van Rooij, The People vs. Pollution, supra note 148, at 67-70. 
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and simply charge a higher price for the new development of the 
land. 
This demonstrates the need for the Chinese government to 
take on a different role in restoration cases.  The Chinese 
government should instead interweave public and private law, 
and use legal and economic tools in conjunction with one another.  
Since actions are usually addressed against new developers 
rather than against polluters, it is doubtful that the actions 
provide incentives to prevent potential polluters.473  Related to 
this is the research referenced above474 discussing the 
“compensation trap,” where victims are paid-off by industry, 
subsequently removing the requirement to prevent pollution.475  
This demonstrates that compensation is only one part of the 
larger issue of environmental problems.  Compensation should 
not be a goal in and of itself, but rather it should provide 
incentives to potential polluters to abate pollution to efficient 
levels.  Given the low probability of a liability suit and the 
minimal damages that would be awarded, it is doubtful that 
environmental liability in China can result in a deterrent effect, 
notwithstanding the recent changes, inter alia as a result of the 
TLL of 2009. 
b. Insurance 
Theoretical analysis shows that compensation instruments 
can complement liability rules in compensating and preventing 
ecological damage.476  The compensation tools used include: (1) 
insurance; (2) environmental funds; and (3) capital market 
works.477  However, the comprehensive compensation system can 
be called into question when liability rules fail to provide an 
efficient deterrent effect.  With the exception of marine oil 
pollution caused by sea-going vessels, there is no general 
requirement of financial security.  The judgment-proof problem 
 
 473. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) (describing the deterrent effect of tort law). 
 474. van Rooij, The Compensation Trap, supra note 148, at 741. 
 475. Id. 
 476. See generally Faure & Liu, supra note 14. 
 477. See generally PATHWAY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra 
note 316. 
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may leave the victims uncompensated, the damaged environment 
unrestored, and may in fact encourage pollution.478  Low liability 
deterrence coupled with a lack of a mandatory financial security 
system leads to fewer compensation instruments in China.479  
The environmental insurance market has only started to develop 
in recent years.  Now insurance possibilities, including general 
liability insurance policies and specific environmental pollution 
liability, are widely available.  Personal injury and property 
damage caused by environmental incidents are generally covered.  
Cleanup costs may be also covered to the extent that they can 
prevent further personal injury and property damage.  Some 
insurance policies480 even cover remediation costs on and from 
the insured sites.  However, gaps still exist as restoration costs 
and cleanups are usually uncovered.  Today serious challenges 
facing insurers persist as premiums remain high and adverse 
selection exists.  The analysis, supra, shows that insurance is not 
broadly used, which is not surprising since environmental 
liability does not constitute a serious threat.  As the seriousness 
of environmental liability in China is not present, the incentives 
for polluters to seek insurance coverage are not pressing.  
However, if environmental liability were to develop further, the 
insurance market would be able to provide at least basic coverage 
for this environmental liability risk. 
c. Marine Oil Pollution 
There is a more comprehensive legal framework in China for 
ecological damage in marine oil pollution cases.  The MEPL 
allows competent public authorities to bring claims for marine 
environmental damage.  Legislation also admits that some parts 
of ecological damage are compensable, such as prevention costs 
and reasonable restoration costs.  This focus can be explained by 
the influence of international conventions, such as the CLC, 
 
 478. See Steven Shavell, The Judgment-Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 45, 54 (1986). 
 479. See generally Polborn, supra note 253 (describing the relationship 
between mandatory insurance and the judgment-proof problem). 
 480. HUATAI PREMISES INSURANCE, supra note 301, at 4. 
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which China has joined.481  Nevertheless, marine environmental 
damage legislation also has inefficient features.  The compensable 
scope of ecological damage is similar to that under the CLC, but it 
is much more limited than the definition of natural resources 
damage in OPA, adopted in the United States.  The United 
States’ system compensates for the loss of ecological service 
pending restoration, and compensates even when restoration is 
impossible.482  Broader compensation is only feasible when clear 
assessment rules are in place, which the Chinese system 
currently lacks.  The Chinese legislation itself does not explicitly 
channel liability to shipowners.  However, because it is usually 
the shipowners who are held liable, any incentive for other 
parties who may have contributed to the risk is diminished.483  
The CMC created a limitation of liability, which is even lower 
than the CLC limits, where a limitation established in the CMC 
applies when an accident falls out of the CLC’s scope.  This CLC 
limitation of liability is also applicable in China.  The capped 
liability, combined with strict liability can provide insufficient 
preventive incentives to shipowners. 
The marine oil pollution compensation system has a more 
developed insurance market.  CSMAA has a long history of 
 
 481. I.M.O. supra note 389, at 242. 
 482. The OPA authorized the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) to promulgate regulations for the assessment of natural 
resource damage in the United States.  33 U.S.C. § 2706(e)(1).  In 1996, NOAA 
promulgated the final rule concerning natural resource damage assessments.  
Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. 440 (Jan. 5, 1996) 
(codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990).  This regulation prescribes a concrete procedure 
and assessment method.  Under the NOAA assessment rule, restoration is 
defined as any action to “restore, rehabilitate, replace, or acquire the equivalent 
of” the damaged natural resources. 15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (2013).  To compensate for 
interim losses, the NOAA rule also adopts a restoration-based approach: 
compensatory restoration is allowed to compensate for the lost “natural 
resources and services that occur from the date of the incident until recovery.”  
Id.  When determining compensatory restoration, trustees should use a 
resource-to-resource or service-to-service approach to compensate for the lost 
natural resources service or value.  If these approaches are not possible, trustees 
can use other evaluation techniques to “estimate the dollar value of the lost 
services and select the scale of the restoration action that has a cost equivalent 
to the lost value.”  Id. § 990.53(d)(3)(ii). 
 483. WANG HUI, CIVIL LIABILITY FOR MARINE OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: A 
COMPARATIVE AND ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL, US AND CHINESE 
COMPENSATION REGIME 249 (Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2011). 
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covering pollution damage to vessels, including preventive 
measures and restoration costs.  A mandatory insurance system 
was adopted in the Regulation on Vessel-Induced Pollution in 
2009, which can relieve the judgment-proof problem. This 
Regulation also led to the establishment of an Oil Spill 
Compensation Fund.  All the cargo owners, or their agents, who 
receive continuous oil cargo carried by sea within the sea areas of 
China make contributions to the fund based on the amount of oil 
they received (0.3 RMB per ton).484  The Fund compliments the 
compensation capacity of the shipowners and their insurers.  
However, basing the contribution only on the amount of oil, and 
not on the actual oil pollution risks, has been criticized since it 
cannot create sufficient preventive incentives for the oil 
industry.485  Economic analysis suggests the duty of 
compensation be placed on the actors that actually contribute to 
the risks, and also that the contributions be in proportion to the 
amount of risk they create.486  To base the contributions to the 
Compensation Fund only on the amount of oil received 
incentivizes the oil industry to change its activity level, but it 
does not shift the oil industry’s safety level (i.e., choosing safer 
vessels to transfer the oil cargo).  One author proposed an oil fund 
system in the United States that has achieved better risk 
differentiation by basing a vessel’s initial contribution on the 
historical oil spills it has created, and allowing a decrease in a 
vessel’s contribution if better safety measures are adopted.487  
However, such a system incurs high administrative costs.488  The 
desirability of risk differentiation depends on the tradeoff 
between the benefits in saving primary costs and the increase of 
secondary and tertiary costs. 
 
 484. Regulation on Compensation Fund, supra note 393, art. 6. 
 485. WANG, supra note 337, at 338-41. 
 486. Id. 
 487. Lance D. Wood, An Integrated International and Domestic Approach to 
Civil Liability for Vessel-Source Oil Pollution, 7 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 47-48 
(1975). 
 488. Id. 
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B. Recommendations to Improve the Compensation 
System 
Important steps have been taken in recent years, both at the 
legislative level and at the practical level, to improve the 
compensation system for environmental damage in China.  These 
developments are undoubtedly important, but claims for 
ecological damage in China still face substantial hurdles in 
obtaining fair compensation.  Therefore, environmental liability 
in China is neither fulfilling its compensatory, nor its preventive 
role.  In this respect, China still has a long way to go.  This 
section attempts to provide some recommendations for the future 
development of the compensation system in China. 
a. Legal Framework 
The analysis, supra, has shown legislative gaps that prevent 
effective compensation for ecological damage in China.  To this 
end, economic analysis and international experience can provide 
some hints to improve the Chinese legal framework. 
Although a comparative comprehensive tort system for 
traditional damage caused by the environment has been 
established, legislation for ecological damage is not promising in 
China, because China still has much left to do at the legislative 
level.  First, a clear obligation in response to an environmental 
accident needs to be established.  Either the polluters or the 
public authorities should take cleanup/restoration measures in 
the case of ecological damage.  A clear division of authority is 
necessary to ensure an effective and timely response.  For 
example, in the United States, various government authorities 
are trustees of specific natural resources, and are required to 
respond to pollution and bring claims for the damage.489  
Authorizing the public agencies can also help to solve the 
standing problem, which is an important hurdle currently facing 
 
 489. For example, in the United States, many federal public authorities, 
including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, and 
Interior, have been authorized to act as trustees for specific types of natural 
resources damage.  See VALERIE ANN LEE & P.J. BRIDGEN, THE NATURAL 
RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT DESKBOOK: A LEGAL AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
157-67 (2002). 
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the natural resources damage claim cases.  The tendency to open 
up space for public interest litigation will give the public 
authorities or NGOs the possibility to bring claims for ecological 
damage.  Furthermore, an explicit definition of the compensable 
ecological damage is also important, and this definition needs to 
be accompanied by a feasible evaluation standard.  Although 
there have been a few cases where compensation for ecological 
damage was awarded for marine oil pollution, judges still 
struggle with how to quantify this damage.  Without a clear 
evaluation standard, compensation for ecological damage will 
likely remain a solution only on paper. 
The development of compensation instruments is still in its 
early stages in China.  Some possibilities started to emerge in the 
insurance market in 2007, but it is reported that the coverage is 
still low and the premiums are comparatively high.  The 
development of environmental liability insurance is possible only 
when there is a serious liability threat facing the potential 
polluters.  The prosperity of the insurance market can be 
advanced with stronger policy support, including subsidies at an 
early stage, linking insurance coverage with pollution fees, and a 
green credit policy.  Although China is not a member of the 
IOPCF, it started to establish its own Compensation Fund in 
2012.  This began China’s attempt to use other compensation 
instruments to cover ecological damage in addition to insurance.  
Making contributions to the Compensation Fund risk related, 
rather than just based on the amount of oil imported, will have a 
stronger deterrent effect.490  Theoretical models show that in 
cases of insolvency risks, compulsory financial security can create 
more efficient incentives.491  However, while insurance and other 
compensation instruments are still new in China, a general 
compulsory financial security system may not be feasible.  
Further development of the insurance market, and alternative 
use of instruments, can help a progressive introduction of a 
compulsory system.492 
 
 490. See WANG, supra note 337, at 338-43 (discussing risk differentiation in 
compensation funds). 
 491. See generally Faure & Liu, supra note 14. 
 492. The progressive introduction of a compulsory system can either start from 
specific geographical areas or certain industries.  In some local areas, such as 
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b. Practical Issues 
Practical obstacles to the traditional environmental liability 
rules prevent the rules from creating sufficient compensation or 
efficient deterrence, and therefore deserve equal attention. 
Theoretical models show that liability rules and 
compensation instruments can complement regulation in 
providing efficient deterrence.  Regulation, liability, and 
compensation instruments for ecological damage compose an 
interlinked system.  Admittedly, environmental regulation is 
subject to weak capacity and capture problems.  However, to 
expect the court system to fill this gap may not work out as well 
as predicted by the theorists in China.493  To some extent, the 
courts in China “are better conceived of as cost-benefit-weighing 
government regulators rather than neutral arbiters.”494  
Sometimes, judges still need to make policy considerations and 
rely on support from the government.  For instance, judges may 
be reluctant to accept sensitive cases, to prove the existence of 
harm, pollution, and causal links, and therefore, the victims need 
support from local environmental agencies in the form of daily 
monitoring data or on-site evaluation reports.  The link between 
the public and the tort system is more obvious in the realm of 
ecological damage, because it is the public authority who 
determines whether and how to restore the damaged 
environment, and whether to start a claim procedure.  Hence, the 
improvement of the liability system also depends on 
strengthening the regulation.  Development of the insurance 
market is a related issue, because without serious liability 
threats, polluters lack incentives to buy liability insurance.  
Policy supports, such as linking insurance with pollution fees or 
other encouraging measures, can also promote the development of 
insurance. Therefore, one cannot expect the liability rules and 
compensation instruments alone to solve the problems created by 
ecological damage.  On the contrary, regulation, liability rules, 
 
Changsha, the government already requires certain high-risk industries to seek 
insurance coverage.   See Changsha Rules, supra note 279, art. 4. 
 493. See McAllister, supra note 466, at 5-7. 
 494. McMullin, supra note 196, at 183. 
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and compensation instruments need to be developed hand-in-
hand. 
The Chinese regulatory system has grown in recent years, as 
China has been trying to enhance its environmental enforcement.  
Although not perfect, recent literature has highlighted a 
convergence towards a more coercive and formal way of 
enforcement.495  Moreover, although judges have incentives to 
avoid political controversy, they do occasionally make innovations 
at the margins by providing new interpretations or validating 
new types of claims.496  The attempt to establish environmental 
courts and allowing public interest litigation also constitute 
additional steps towards compensation for ecological damage. 
Although there is still a long way for China to go to reach a sound 
compensation system for ecological damage, opportunities for 
efforts and improvements are available at both the legislative and 
the practice levels. 
 
 
 
 495. See generally Benjamin van Rooij & Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Fragile 
Convergence: Understanding Variation in the Enforcement of China’s Industrial 
Pollution Law, 32 L. & POL’Y 14 (2010). 
 496. Stern, supra note 154, at 91-93. 
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